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Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate
Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism
Jay D. Wexler*
In the last few years, Court-watchers have been particularly busy critiquing the constitutional decisions of the splintered Rehnquist Court. Two of
the recurring critiques have posited that the Justices are overly activist and
that their opinions are needlessly confusing. American Lawyer's Stuart Taylor, for example, has decried both the "jurisprudential mess" of the Court's
recent redistricting decisions' as well as the disturbing activism that Taylor
believes marks each of the Equal Protection decisions of the 1995-96 Terman activism that has led him to wonder "whether there is any life at all left in
the idea of judicial restraint."' 2 Eva Rodriguez of the Legal Times is even
more critical of the Court's failure to issue opinions that lower courts and
lawyers can follow, noting that "the justices have perplexed many court aficionados, who have spent long hours trying to decipher fractured and at
times fractious decisions." 3 Likewise, Linda Greenhouse, the influential New
4
York Times writer, has lamented both the activism of the Rehnquist Court

and its failure to provide guidance, arguing that the Court has "sometimes
spoke[n] in multiple voices so muddled as to be barely comprehensible." 5
Academics and practitioners have joined the fray as well, with noted law
professors such as Erwin Chemerinsky and Supreme Court lawyers like The*

Law clerk to The Honorable David S. Tatel, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.

J.D. Stanford Law School, 1997; M.A. University of Chicago, 1993; B.A. Harvard University,
1991. Many thanks to Thomas Grey and Kathleen Sullivan for their helpful comments and suggestions, and to Robert Klieger, who is definitely "entitled" to my gratitude. Also, I would like
to thank Bryan Corbett, Jennifer Chung, Ryan Wallach, and the staff at The George Washington
Law Review for all their hard work and excellent editing.
1 See Stuart Taylor Jr., Drawing the Line on Racial Gerrymanders,LEGAL TIMEs, July 31,
1995, at S29 ("Justice O'Connor's handiwork [in race-based electoral districting cases] is a jurisprudential mess-a confusing and indeterminate m6lange of apparently conflicting statutory and
constitutional doctrines, which provides little useful guidance to lower courts and amounts to a
formula for endless litigation and political chaos.").
2 Stuart Taylor Jr., Is JudicialRestraintDead?, N.J. L.J., Aug. 26, 1996, at S-1 ("The theme
is that it is becoming ever more clear that not a single member of the current Court can be called
a consistent practitioner of judicial restraint. Each of the equal protection decisions-which
were lauded, in turn, by liberal advocates of gay rights and women's rights, and by conservative
advocates of 'colorblind Constitution' jurisprudence-was an exercise in judicial activism. And
each of the nine justices joined at least one of them.").
3 Eva M. Rodriguez, Confusion from the High Court, CorN. L. TRIB., July 15, 1996, at 9.
4 See Linda Greenhouse, Gavel Rousers: Farewell to the Old Order in the Court, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 2, 1995, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1 ("An ascendant bloc of three conservative Justices with an appetite for fundamental, even radical change drove the Court on a re-examination
of basic Constitutional principles.").
5 Linda Greenhouse, In Supreme Court's Decisions, a Clear Voice, and a Murmur, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 3, 1996, at Al.
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odore Olson voicing their 6concerns about the growing activism and divisiveness of the current Court.
These two complaints-that the justices reach whatever decisions they
want and that they provide little guidance to lower courts and practitionersecho the long-standing critiques leveled by judges and academics at the judicial use of standards rather than rules to decide cases. 7 In constitutional law
discourse, this distinction is often framed as the difference between categorization and balancing.8 When a court uses a categorization technique, it simply determines whether a particular state action infringes upon a clearly
defined right; if it does, the law is unconstitutional regardless of the strength
of the state's interest. 9 On the other hand, when a court employs a balancing
technique, it weighs the various interests and rights at stake against each
other to determine the constitutionality of the state's action. 10 Scholars disagree about the extent to which the current Supreme Court favors balancing
over categorization." Although Justices Scalia and Thomas strongly favor a
6 See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Fall Cases Offer Court Chance to Flex Muscles, DENV. Posr, Aug.
6, 1995, at 28A (quoting Georgetown law professor Louis Michael Seidman as saying, "This term
saw a dramatic shift with the conservatives not only exerting more control but also engaging in
judicial activism by striking down laws and policies"); W. John Moore, High Court's Conservatives Are in Charge,NAT'L. J., July 8, 1995, at 1772 (quoting Chemerinsky as saying, "It is much
more an activist Supreme Court"); David O'Brien, Rehnquist Tilt, DALLAS MORNING NEws, July
9, 1995, at 5J (criticizing the redistricting and affirmative action decisions of the Rehnquist
Court); Rodriguez, supra note 3, at 9, 11 (quoting Olson as saying, "It seems to me that what
they're doing is saying, 'We can apply whatever standard we decide to apply and come to the
results that our instincts tell us is right,"' and quoting Georgetown law professor David Cole and
Mayer, Brown & Platt partner Roy Englert Jr., both of whom criticized the Court for providing
little guidance to courts and practitioners).
7 See CAsS R. SUNsTEiN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLIcr 113-14 (1996)

(arguing that rules serve to constrain decisionmakers in particular cases and promote predictability and planning for private actors); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179-80 (1989) (arguing that rules promote judicial restraint as well as
predictability and certainty); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards,33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 400
(1985) (listing vices of standards, including manipulability, indeterminacy, and adventurism);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Cour 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards,106 HARv. L. Rnv. 22, 62-65 (1992) (listing arguments for rules over standards). On
the distinction between rules and standards, see generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRTICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987) and FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LnFE 104 (1991).

8 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,96 YALE L.J.
943, 949 (1987); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-LiberalJudging: The Roles of Categorizationand
Balancing,63 U. COLO. L. REv. 293, 293-94 (1992). The debate over categorization and balancing has been particularly acute in the First Amendment arena. See John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of CategorizationandBalancing in FirstAmendment Analysis, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1490-1508 (1975); Laurent B. Frantz, The FirstAmendment in the Balance,
71 YALE LJ. 1424 (1962); Laurent B. Frantz, Is the FirstAmendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CAL. L. Rv. 729 (1963); Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First
Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REv. 821 (1962).
9 See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 293.
10 See id. at 293-94.
11 Compare Alienikoff, supra note 8, at 943-44 (arguing that balancing is pervasive), with
Sullivan, supra note 8, at 295-96 ("Categorical and balancing approaches oscillate in an endless
dialectic, casting doubt on any claim that either has become fully dominant.").
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rules-based jurisprudence 12 and have led the Court to employ categorization

in many circumstances,

3

the Court continues to balance frequently. 14 This

balancing approach, perhaps more than anything else, has aroused the ire of

Court-watchers in search of restraint and clarity.
Intermediate scrutiny is one of the Court's most frequently employed
balancing techniques. 15 Unlike strict scrutiny, which is generally "'strict' in

theory and fatal in fact,"'16 or rationality review, which is used to uphold laws
justified even by hypothesized or ad hoc state interests, 17 intermediate scrutiny requires the Court to weigh conflicting rights and interests and does not
predetermine the outcome of the case. 18 Depending on how the Court values

the respective interests of the state and the claimant, either may prevail. 19 As
12 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1518 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the CentralHudson balancing test should not be applied "to a restriction of 'commercial' speech ... when ... the asserted interest is one that is to be achieved
through keeping would-be recipients of the speech in the dark"); Scalia, supra note 7 (arguing
for a rule-of-law approach over a "discretion-conferring approach"). For a discussion of Justice
Scalia's rule-based jurisprudence, see Sullivan, supra note 8, at 301-05.
13 See, e.g., Carlisle v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1460, 1470 (1996) (holding that Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(e) constrains a trial judge from granting a motion for judgment
of acquittal filed one day outside the seven-day time limit prescribed by the rule); Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-90 (1990) (applying rationality
review to all laws of general application that incidentally burden religion).
14 See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996) (holding that a police practice of
not informing a stopped driver, after traffic stop and before initiating consensual interrogation,
that he is free to go is not unreasonable and refusing to adopt bright-line rules for Fourth
Amendment analysis); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374,
2390-94 (1996) (weighing the government's interest in protecting children against the burden on
cable operators and programmers); United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275-82 (1996)
(weighing a state's interest in maintaining its sole single-sex public institution of higher learning
against the educational harm to women resulting from a categorical exclusion).
15 I use the term "intermediate scrutiny" here to refer to a test that requires a state interest which is greater than legitimate but less than compelling and a fit between means and end
that is not necessarily narrowly tailored but has more than just an incidental connection. The
Court has employed intermediate scrutiny in a variety of contexts, including gender discrimination, affirmative action, regulation of commercial speech, content-neutral burdens on speech,
and time, place, and manner restrictions on speech. Generally, the formulation requires a law to
substantially relate to an important end. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200, 204 (1976).
For a discussion of the Court's applications of intermediate scrutiny, see infra notes 118-126 and
accompanying text.
16 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8
(1972).
17 See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (applying
rational-basis review and stating that "[w]here, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress'
action, our inquiry is at an end. It is, of course, 'constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision,' because this Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute" (citation omitted) (quoting Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960))).
18 See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 297 ("'Intermediate scrutiny,' unlike the poles of the twotier system, is an overtly balancing mode."); id. at 293-94 ("[T]he judge's job [in balancing] is to
place competing rights and interests on a scale and weigh them against each other. Here the
outcome is not determined at the outset, but depends on the relative strength of a multitude of
factors.").
19 See id. at 298 ("Where intermediate scrutiny governs, the outcome is no longer foreor-
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a paradigmatic balancing approach, intermediate scrutiny has been consistently critiqued by judges and scholars who point to its indeterminacy and its
invitation to judicial activism. On the very day of its inception in the 1976
case of Craig v. Boren,20 for example, then-Justice Rehnquist declared that
the test was "so diaphanous and elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices relating to particular types of legislation."' 21 Later critics
have been no kinder, calling the test "malleable," 22 uncertain,23 "highly flexible,"' 24 "unpredictable," 25 "contrived,' 26 "inconsistent," 27 and inadequate.28
Not only are the terms of the intermediate scrutiny test themselves indeterminate,29 but the test itself has also been particularly vulnerable to manipulation by the Supreme Court. On a number of occasions, the Court has

either explicitly applied strict scrutiny to an area traditionally governed by
intermediate scrutiny or changed the wording of the intermediate scrutiny
test to require a justification falling somewhere between intermediate and
strict scrutiny. For example, in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 30 the
Court highlighted the differences between statutes and injunctions to reject
the intermediate standard generally applicable to content-neutral laws, 31 and
instead applied a standard somewhat more stringent than intermediate scrutiny but less stringent than strict scrutiny,32 or what Justice Scalia referred to
dained at the threshold. Instead of winning always or never, the government may sometimes win
or sometimes lose-it all depends.").
20 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
21 Id. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
22 The Supreme Court 1995 Term-Leading Cases, 110 HARv. L. REv. 135, 185 (1996).
23 See George C. Hlavac, Chapter, Interpretationof the Equal Protection Clause. A Constitutional Shell Game, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1349, 1378 (1993); id. at 1375 ("The intermediatescrutiny test... has no basis whatsoever in precedent prior to Craig v. Boren, and is a much
more malleable test that permits judges' subjective preferences to come into play. It is necessary
to put an end to the Supreme Court's shell game ....
(footnote omitted)).
24 Rachel Stephanie Arnow, The Implantation of Rights: An Argument for Unconditionally Funded Norplant Removal, 11 BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 19, 45 (1996).
25 Id.
26

Id.

Deborah L. Brake, Sex as a Suspect Class: An Argument for Applying Strict Scrutiny to
Gender Discrimination,6 SETON HALL CONsT. L.J. 953, 958 (1996).
28 See Colln O'Connor Udell, Note, Signaling a New Direction in Gender Classification
Scrutiny: United States v. Virginia, 29 CoNN. L. Rnv. 521, 521, 552 (1996); see also Sullivan,
supra note 8, at 301 ("[Intermediate scrutiny] makes the Court more vulnerable to the charge of
'legislating from the bench.' No amount of bureaucratic lingo in the formulas of intermediate
scrutiny.., can wholly dispel that Lochnerian feeling one can get from intermediate scrutiny's
shifting bottom line." (footnote omitted)); John Galotto, Note, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, via
Croson, 93 COLuM. L. Rv. 508, 545 (1993) ("[I]ntermediate scrutiny has chafed at the Court
and has failed to convince most scholars."); Note, A Madisonian Interpretation of the Equal
Protection Doctrine, 91 YALE L.J. 1403, 1412 (1982) ("Unfortunately, standards of middle level
review give the courts relatively little guidance in individual cases.").
29 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("How is
this Court to divine what objectives are important? How is it to determine whether a particular
law is 'substantially' related to the achievement of such objective, rather than related in some
other way to its achievement?"); Udell, supra note 28, at 547-52 (describing problems of "inner
and outer context" that render the intermediate scrutiny standard indeterminate).
30 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
31 See id. at 764-65.
32 See id. at 765 ("[Wjhen evaluating a content-neutral injunction, we think that our stan27
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as "intermediate-intermediate scrutiny." 33 In Adarand Constructors,Inc. v.
Pena,3 4 the Court applied strict scrutiny to congressionally mandated affirma-

tive action contracting programs, 35 overruling its earlier decision in Metro
Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC,36 in which the Court had applied intermediate
scrutiny to such programs. 37 In 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode Island,38 at least
four members of the Court applied a standard stricter than the traditional
intermediate scrutiny standard generally applied to regulations of truthful,
40
nonmisleading commercial speech. 39 Finally, in United States v. Virginia,
the Court required the government to offer an "exceedingly persuasive" justification for discriminating on the basis of gender,41 a standard that many
commentators believe is stricter than the intermediate scrutiny standard previously applied to gender-based laws.42 These manipulations of the intermedard time, place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently rigorous. We must ask instead whether
the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a
significant government interest.").
33 Id. at 791 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
34 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
35 See id. at 235 ("Federal racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest.").
36 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. 200.
37 See id. at 564-65 ("We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress ... are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important governmental
objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." (footnote omitted)).
38 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
39 See id. at 1507 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.)
("[W]hen a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial
messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less
reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands."); id. at
1508 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., Souter, J., and Ginsburg, J.) ("[T]here is no
question that Rhode Island's price advertising ban constitutes a blanket prohibition against
truthful, nonmisleading speech about a lawful product. There is also no question that the ban
serves an end unrelated to consumer protection. Accordingly, we must review... with 'special
care,' mindful that speech prohibitions of this type rarely survive constitutional review." (citation
omitted)); id. at 1515-16 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In cases such as this, in which the government's asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace, the balancing test adopted in CentralHudson ... should
not be applied, in my view. Rather, such an 'interest' is per se illegitimate .... " (citation omitted)). For more on how the Justices came out in the case, see infra note 275.
40 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
41 See id. at 2275.
42 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword. Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4,75 (1996) ("[T]he Court did not merely restate the intermediate scrutiny test but pressed it closer to strict scrutiny. After United States v. Virginia, it is not
simple to describe the appropriate standard of review. States must satisfy a standard somewhere
between intermediate and strict scrutiny."); Udell, supranote 28, at 553 ("Justice Ginsburg... is
moving the Court... to ... finally endorse strict scrutiny for gender classifications. She did not
have to look outside precedent for the more rigorous formulation of the intermediate scrutiny
test she employed, the 'exceedingly persuasive justification' formulation. But she moved the
phrase to a pivotal primary position .. " (footnote omitted)); Rodriguez, supra note 3 ("[Ginsburg] adopted a standard that seemed to go beyond the intermediate scrutiny that had been
applied to gender classifications in the past."); Taylor, supra note 2 (stating that the Virginia
decision "hints that gender classifications should be subjected to something close to 'strict
scrutiny"').
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diate scrutiny standard have led dissenting Justices to critique them as
43
violations of stare decisis.
All of these critiques of intermediate scrutiny-that it promotes activism, confuses lower courts, and threatens principles of stare decisis-are important and troubling. Nevertheless, this Article argues that, despite the
criticisms, intermediate scrutiny remains an indispensable tool that the Court
should employ in particular situations. Specifically, it argues that intermediate scrutiny is a form of judicial minimalism that is uniquely suited to resolving analogical crises over time. This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I,
the Article explores and expands upon Cass Sunstein's theory of judicial
minimalism. Professor Sunstein posits that in situations where either factual
circumstances or moral judgments are in flux, the Supreme Court should act
in ways that will further rather than forestall democratic deliberation and
should render judgments that avoid statements of broad principle, thereby
allowing room for moral and legal evolution over time.44 Part II first discusses the Court's use of intermediate scrutiny and the concept of analogical
crisis, which posits that the Court applies intermediate scrutiny when it is
unsure whether a particular claimed right is more like one that is protected
by strict scrutiny or one that is protected by mere rationality review. 45 Part II
then proceeds to argue that intermediate scrutiny can be a form of judicial
minimalism that can appropriately resolve these crises over time because it
invites democratic deliberation, allows for moral evolution, promotes societal
education, and provides judges with greater opportunities to consider the details of analogical crises. In Part III, the Article employs the theoretical
framework set forth in Part II to evaluate recent decisions of the Court. This
part makes the descriptive argument that the Court perhaps has sometimes
used intermediate scrutiny to 'at least partially resolve analogical crises.
More important, Part III makes the normative argument that the Court could
go a long way towards silencing critics of intermediate scrutiny by explicitly
announcing its use of the doctrine as a transitional tool to resolve moral and
legal uncertainty. Finally, the Article concludes with some final thoughts
about the future application of intermediate scrutiny.
.
A.

The Benefits and Limits of Judicial Minimalism

Sunstein's Constitutional Theory

In his Supreme Court Foreword to the 1995 Term, Cass Sunstein draws
upon a tradition of scholarship addressing deliberative democracy and its relationship to the judiciary46 to argue in favor of "decisional minimalism," a
43 See, e.g., Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2291 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the decision
"drastically revises our established standards for reviewing sex-based classifications"); Adarand

Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 264 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority's
concept of stare decisis ignores the force of binding precedent.").
44 See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 7-9.

See Sullivan, supra note 7, at 61 n.248.
46 Sunstein makes clear his debt to a number of important works, including ALEXANDER
M. BicKEr, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CoNFUCr (1992), AMY GUTmANN & DENNs THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
(1996), JORGEN HABERMAS, BETwEEN FAcrs AND NoRms (William Rehg trans., MIT Press
45

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol 66:298

phrase that refers to "the phenomenon of saying no more than necessary to
justify an outcome, and leaving as much as possible undecided." 47 According
to Sunstein, minimalist judges48 write decisions that are both narrow, in the
sense that they decide the case at hand rather than articulate broad rules to
govern other cases, 49 and shallow, in the sense that they rely on "incompletely theorized agreements" and avoid "issues of basic principle. '50 Minimalists give explanations for their decisions, but they reason analogically
rather than deductively.5 1 They think "by close reference to actual and hypothetical cases" rather than seeing the outcomes of cases "as reflecting rules or
theories laid down in advance. 52z Minimalism contrasts with maximalism,
which Sunstein defines as "an effort to decide cases in a way that establishes
broad rules for the future and that also gives deep theoretical justifications
for outcomes. '53 Minimalism can take many forms. In addition to not deciding all possible issues in a case in accordance with broadly applicable and
deeply reasoned principles, minimalists can deny certiorari, avoid deciding
constitutional questions, investigate actual rather than hypothetical purposes
of statutes, and follow prior holdings but not prior dicta.5 4 Sunstein
describes
'55
these minimalist techniques as "constructive uses of silence.
Minimalism has two principal advantages. First, minimalism is both democracy-friendly and democracy-forcing because it "leaves issues open for
democratic deliberation,.., promotes reason-giving and ensures that certain
important decisions are made by democratically accountable actors. ' 56 Second, by refusing to decide issues that either may be affected by quickly
changing factual circumstances or are not supported by any clear moral consensus among members of the society, minimalism minimizes judicial mistakes.5 7 This advantage is particularly important in cases surrounded by
1996) (1992), Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Foreword: Antidiscrimination
and ConstitutionalAccountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REv.
80 (1991), and Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword- Traces of Self-

Government, 100 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1986). See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 7-9 & nn.3-5, 7-8.
47 Sunstein, supra note 42, at 6-7. Sunstein's Foreword builds upon and expands a constitutional theory that he has been developing for several years. See SuNsMIN, supra note 7, at 35100; Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARv. L. Rnv. 1733 (1995)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements]; Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical
Reasoning,106 HARV. L. REv. 741 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning]; Cass
R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953 (1995) [hereinafter Sunstein, Problems
with Rules].
48 Sunstein believes that on the current Court, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer are essentially minimalists. See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 14-15.
49 See id. at 15-20.
50 Id. at 20.
51 See id. at 14.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 15.
54 See id. at 7.
55 Id.
56 Id. (footnote omitted).
57 See id. at 8. Sunstein asserts:
[A] minimalist path usually-not always, but usually-makes sense when the Court
is dealing with an issue of high complexity about which many people feel deeply
and on which the nation is in flux (moral or otherwise). The complexity may result
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morally charged disagreement where a maximalist decision may "activate
forces of opposition," "produce an intense social backlash," and "hinder so58
cial deliberation, learning, compromise, and moral evolution over time.
These two powerful rationales often will combine in hard cases to counsel in
favor of following a minimalist path.
Minimalism, however, is not always appropriate. Indeed, minimalism
has two important drawbacks. First, although the decision costs may be
lower for the actual judge who employs judicial minimalism, the minimalist
decision may "export" decision costs to lower courts and practitioners by
leaving open a variety of unanswered questions.5 9 Second, minimalism may
threaten the ideal of the rule of law in certain circumstances by allowing
lower courts to treat similarly situated parties differently. 60 This possibility is
especially problematic in situations where advanced planning is important; in
these situations, people require clarity to plan their affairs and will prefer
broad rules to narrow holdings.61 For these two reasons, Sunstein recognizes
that whether a minimalist path is appropriate in any particular situation depends on a variety of pragmatic considerations. 62 Sunstein summarizes the
factors that favor minimalism and those that favor maximalism as follows:
From these observations we cannot come up with an algorithm to
decide when minimalism makes sense, but some generalizations
may be helpful. Anglo-American judges usually speak as if
minimalism is the appropriate presumption, and of course if
minimalism is the only possible route for a multimember tribunal,
then minimalism will be inevitable. Minimalism becomes more attractive if judges are proceeding in the midst of factual or (constitutionally relevant) moral uncertainty and rapidly changing
circumstances, if any solution seems likely to be confounded by future cases, or if the need for advance planning is not insistent. But
the argument for a broad and deep solution becomes stronger if
diverse judges have considerable confidence in the merits of that
solution, if the solution can reduce costly uncertainty for other
branches, future courts, and litigants (and hence decision costs
would otherwise be high), or if advance planning is important. 63
from a lack of information, from changing circumstances, or from (legally relevant)

moral uncertainty.
Id.(footnote omitted).
58 ld.
at 33. Sunstein believes that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), arguably made this
maximalist mistake. See id. at 50. For a similar evaluation of Roe, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Ray. 375,385-

86 (1985).
59 See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 28-29.

60 See id. at 29 ("It is true that rules may be unfair if they place diverse situations under a
single umbrella. But it may be even worse to allow cases to be decided by multiple district court
judges thinking very differently about the problem at hand.").
61 See id.

62 See id.at 30.
63 Id.
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Sunstein, unlike the commentators discussed earlier, 64 generally supports the Supreme Court's recent constitutional decisions. Although he finds
the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans65 astonishing for its failure to mention
Bowers v. Hardwick,66 he believes that the decision's caution, prudence, and
understanding of the fundamental purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
make it a "masterful stroke-an extraordinary and salutary moment in
American law."'67 He approves of Justice Breyer's minimalist decision in
Denver Area EducationalTelecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC68 because rapid technological change, the lack of information regarding the effects of programming on children, and the absence of a need for planning all
counseled against a maximalist decision in the case. 69 Likewise, Sunstein approves of Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Virginia both because it analyzed the
state's actual purposes in perpetuating the college's single-sex policy and because it focused on the unique qualities of the Virginia Military Institute
rather than on single-sex schools generally. 70 He also approves of both Justice Stevens's majority opinion and Justice Breyer's concurrence in BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore,71 both of which displayed a wise minimalism
appropriate to the exceedingly complex question of when excessive punitive
damages should be unconstitutional. 72 Finally, Sunstein disapproves of the
plurality's opinion in 44 Liquormart, which by failing to follow the Court's
previous decisions on commercial speech, blurred the important distinctions
between political and commercial speech and announced a problematic
broad principle to govern regulations of true and nonmisleading advertis64 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.

65 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996).
66 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For Sunstein's discussion of this omission, see Sunstein, supranote
42, at 64-69.
67 Sunstein, supra note 42, at 9.

68 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996). The Court upheld section 10(a) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, which permits cable operators to prohibit leased
access channels from airing indecent programming. See id. at 2390 (plurality opinion). Unlike
Justice Thomas, who would have upheld the law because it simply restored to the operators
at 2423-24 (Thomas,
rights of editorial discretion that federal regulations had taken away, see id.
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), Justice Breyer considered a variety
of factors, including the importance of the state interest and the similarity of the regulation to
the one upheld in FCC v. PacificaFoundation,438 U.S. 726 (1978), see Denver Area, 116 S.Ct. at

2386-87 (plurality opinion). Not all commentators have been as full of praise for the decision as
Sunstein. See Linda Greenhouse, When a Justice Suffers from Indecision, N.Y. Tnrms, July 14,

1996, at E5 (quoting First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams as saying that the decision was
"disturbing"). For more on Denver Area, see infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
69 See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 31-32.
70 See id. at 74-77.

71 116 S.Ct. 1589 (1996).
72 See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 79-82. Sunstein states:
With respect to punitive damages, a minimalist approach of some kind is probably
the wisest course for the present time.... In view of the complexity of the underlying issues, it is best for the Court to pursue a minimalist course in which it invalidates only the most extreme outcomes. To return to our basic theme, minimalism
can be seen as a way of reducing decision costs and error costs, and the Court is not
now in a good position to generate anything like clear rules to constrain punitive
damages.
Id. at 81-82 (footnote omitted).
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ing. 73 The Court's lack of caution was inappropriate for an issue that continues to require a minimalist approach. 74 In sum, although Sunstein devotes
much effort to distinguishing between those cases that demand minimalism
and those that counsel against it, in practice, he seems to think that minimalism is almost always the appropriate course for constitutional
decisionmaking. 75
B. Evolutionary Constitutionalism
Sunstein recognizes that judicial minimalism, by leaving questions open
for future cases, can facilitate legal evolution over time.76 By providing
judges with the flexibility required to adapt to changing situations, minimalism allows judges to adopt maximalist solutions when such solutions become
appropriate. Sunstein hints at this strategy in his Forewordwhen he says that
minimalism is uniquely suited to situations in which there is either factual or
moral uncertainty,77 but he makes the point even more clearly in earlier
works, in which, he notes, for example that, "[S]mall-scale, low-level principles can eventually become part of something more ambitious ....After a
time, the use of low-level principles can produce a more completely theorized
78
system of law."
Sunstein describes several scenarios involving the shift from minimalism
to maximalism. First, he argues that judges may adopt a maximalist approach
in response to commentators and observers who have written on a particular
area of law.7 9 These observers, who have the luxury of spending a great deal
of time pondering discrete legal issues, often can sort through case law and
suggest deeply principled and highly theorized solutions to questions that
judges, who act under greater time and resource restraints, have previously
dealt with through minimalist means.80 One example of this exchange is the
development of an antitrust jurisprudence that incorporates the principle of
economic efficiency articulated by scholars of law and economics. 8 ' Second,
by analyzing a variety of cases on the same issue, judges can reach a deeper
understanding of the issue over time. 82 Third, background conditions can
change, making a particular maximalist solution that was inconceivable in the
past seem quite obvious over time.83 Broad shifts in moral consensus among
members of society can affect judges' interpretations of controversial issues
in constitutional law. As examples of this point, Sunstein points to racial
73 See id. at 82-86.
74 See id.
75 But see id. at 76-77 (defending both the decision in Brown v. Board of Education and

the deep discussion of gender equality in United States v. Virginia as appropriate uses of
maximalism).
76 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
77 See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 30-33.
78 SuNSTEiN, supra note 7, at 55.
79

See Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 47, at 1765.

80 See SuNsTEn, supra note 7, at 54-55.

81 See id. at 55.
82 See Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 47, at 1764.
83 See id. at 1765-68.
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intermarriage, once condemned but now accepted, and gender discrimina84
tion, once accepted but now perceived as similar to race discrimination.
But although Sunstein recognizes this evolutionary advantage of
minimalism, he equivocates both on how often minimalism gives way to maximalism and on how important the shift is to the case for minimalism. He
does suggest that if judges can agree upon a high-level theory to resolve some
particular legal issue, it "is an occasion for celebration," 85 but he seems to
think that such agreement rarely occurs. 86 This position implicitly suggests
that he believes that conditions that counsel in favor of a minimalist approach will rarely evolve into conditions that require maximalist solutions.
Moreover, when he considers specific cases, Sunstein does not always rigorously examine the issue of whether minimalist conditions have given way to
maximalist ones. For example, in his consideration of 44 Liquormart,Sunstein criticizes the plurality for reaching a conclusion-truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech should be treated the same as political speech-that
he thinks is both doubtful in principle and apt to create difficulties down the
road. 87 But his comment is not so much a criticism of employing a maximalist approach instead of a minimalist one as it is a criticism of employing one
particular maximalist approach rather than another. Sunstein does not believe that commercial speech (even truthful and nonnisleading commercial
speech) deserves the same protection as political speech,88 but his position8 9
does not mean that the area is in such flux or disarray that the Court should
refrain from implementing a maximalist solution when it believes such a response is appropriate. In fact, the plurality opinion in 44 Liquormart,as well
as Justice Thomas's concurrence in that case and the Court's opinion in
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,90 suggest that the Court has thoughtfully contemplated the question of how nonmisleading commercial speech should be
treated and is forming a broad, maximalist consensus on the issue. 91 Sunstein's disagreement with the Court's approach does not mean that the
Court, which has considered many commercial speech cases and has the benefit both of countless commentaries and perhaps a shift in societal attitudes
towards advertising regulations, should not announce some broad principles
84 Id. at 1766.
85 SuisTEIN, supra note 7, at 56.
86 See id. at 57.
87 See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 84-86. Sunstein asserts:
Moreover, the idea that commercial speech should be treated the same as political
speech is historically unsupported. It is also doubtful in principle. The protection
of commercial speech has a great deal in common with the protection of market
arrangements in the Lochner era, and it has similar pitfalls.... The plurality's
broader principle may create difficulties for the future, as in easily imaginable cases
involving protection of teenagers from cigarette advertising or violent programming. In 44 Liquormart,there was no reason for the Court to create this risk.

Id. at 86 (footnotes omitted).
88 See, e.g., CAss R. SUNSTEIN, THE

PARTIAL CONSTITTION

236-39 (1993) (arguing that

the First Amendment should primarily protect political speech, defined as speech "both intended
and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue").
89 And, granted, the position of other scholars who agree with him. See infra note 279.
90 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
91 See infra notes 275-288 and accompanying text.
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if it can agree on them. It is unfortunate that Sunstein does not consider the
possibility that conditions have changed; his analysis of 44 Liquormartsuggests that his theoretical position is not always borne out in his consideration
of concrete cases.
This absence of analysis is particularly unfortunate because one of the
best arguments in favor of using minimalism in conditions of moral or factual
flux is that it allows for a shift to maximalism when these conditions have
reached some level of stasis. Moreover, minimalism does more than allow
such a shift; it may even help cause the shift. By leaving questions open, the
Court can open a dialogue with other governmental actors, can invite legal
scholars to comment on issues that they hope to influence, can require lower
courts to consider the issues and analyze them in written opinions that the
Court can then learn from, and can guarantee that the Court will have the
opportunity to hear additional cases in which it can revise and expand upon
its previous attempts at resolving the issues. This process perhaps has happened already in the commercial speech, affirmative action, and gender discrimination areas. 92 It probably also occurred to some degree in the First
Amendment obscenity and incitement contexts where, over time, the Court
eventually replaced case-by-case determinations (minimalism) with broadly
applicable and deeply theorized formulations (maximalism). 93 Likewise,
though Sunstein praises Romer and Denver Area for their minimalist reactions to changing circumstances, one of the attractive features of both cases is
that the Court's opinions are narrow enough so that when consensus finally
forms on gay rights and when the face of modern broadcasting technologies
becomes clear, the Court will still have room to announce maximalist principles to govern both situations. The important challenge will be to recognize
when those days are here; it will not do to continue preaching minimalism
when the time for maximalism has arrived.
C. Lingering Questions
Sunstein's framework for constitutional decisionmaking is well-reasoned, illuminating, and extremely persuasive. It leaves open, however, sev92 See infra notes 248-289 and accompanying text.
93 This is more true for incitement than obscenity, for the Miller test is still quite minimalist, though not nearly as minimalist as the Redrup approach. CompareRedrup v. New York, 386
U.S. 767, 770-71 (1967) (discussing a variety of views on whether a state can criminalize the
distribution of obscenity and then concluding without analysis that "[w]hichever of these consti-

tutional views is brought to bear upon the cases before us, it is clear that the judgments cannot
stand"), with Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The test adopted in Miller is:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
On incitement, compare Dennis v. UnitedStates, 341 U.S. 494, 515 (1951), which established
the "clear and present danger test," with Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (per

curiam), which held that a state cannot prohibit advocacy of law-breaking activity unless such
advocacy is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action."
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eral questions that are uniquely important in evaluating the Court's use of
intermediate scrutiny. The following sections expand upon Sunstein's theory
and argue that (1) minimalism is more appropriate in cases involving moral,
rather than factual, uncertainty; (2) when deciding whether to employ
minimalism, the Court should consider not only its appropriateness in any
given case, but also the extent to which it already has used minimalism in
other cases because a Court that uses too much minimalism may undermine
its own legitimacy; and (3) when deciding what kind of minimalism to employ
in a situation involving moral flux, the Court should choose one that will
facilitate a shift to conditions favoring maximalism.
1. Facts vs. Values
Sunstein suggests that minimalism is equally appropriate for situations
involving factual and moral uncertainty. At more than one point in his Foreword, he argues that either changing factual circumstances or constitutionally
relevant moral uncertainty can justify taking a minimalist path. 94 Minimalism, therefore, was the correct solution not only for the lack of a consensus
regarding gay rights in Romer but also for the quickly changing technological
environment at issue in Denver Area.95
There is good reason to believe that the arguments in favor of minimalism, however, are more persuasive in cases involving disputes over values
than in those involving rapidly evolving factual circumstances. First, cases
involving changing facts do not ordinarily present the possibility for social
backlash that Professor Sunstein discusses and that is quite possibly the most
compelling justification for courts to move slowly. 96 Although one might imagine that a broad maximalist ruling on a morally charged and highly divisive
issue like same-sex marriage could, like the Roe v. Wade decision, mobilize
opposition and undermine the rationality of public debate, such a result is
probably unlikely when the question is simply one of rapidly changing facts.
Second, a maximalist ruling in an area of evolving factual circumstances
does not raise the same type of stare decisis concerns that a maximalist decision in a case involving moral flux might implicate. A court that issues a
maximalist ruling on, for example, same-sex marriages but a decade later
finds that it must reverse its maximalist ruling with another equally maximalist ruling that comports more closely with a new moral consensus will face
serious stare decisis obstacles. But a court will not meet such obstacles if the
only change from the first to the second case is a purely factual one because
the application of settled principles of law to a new fact situation does not
violate principles of stare decisis. 97 Third, courts, as a matter of institutional
See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 8, 30.
See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 32-33.
97 See Lawrence C. Marshall, Contempt of Congress: A Reply to the Critics of an Absolute
Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. Rnv. 2467,2468-69 (1990) ("There is a critical differ94
95
96

ence between the precedential import of a legal standardarticulated by a court and the specific
applicationof the standard to the set of facts before the court. An absolute rule of statutory
stare decisis does not claim to govern applications of law to changing factual patterns .... ");
John Wallace, Comment, Stare Decisis and the Rehnquist Court The Collision of Activism, Pas-
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capacity, are simply better at adjudicating disputes involving everyday facts
than they are at resolving sensitive moral issues.98 Courts, with their traditional attention to detail and focus on particular factual controversies, are
better equipped to grapple with the intricacies of the cable television industry
despite its rapidly changing technology, than they are to wrestle with the extremely difficult ethical question of whether to extend the right to marry to
gays and lesbians. For these reasons, courts should be more willing to embark on maximalist rulings in cases involving complicated and changing facts
than they should be in cases involving difficult ethical quandaries.
Examined in this light, Justice Breyer's opinion in Denver Area appears
both refreshing and frustrating. On the one hand, the opinion breaks new,
important ground by openly acknowledging that the Court does not know
exactly how to resolve the case and that therefore it will tread slowly and
carefully through new terrain. 99 On the other hand, this case was inappropriate for such minimalistic caution. Justice Breyer is surely right to recognize
that drawing analogies is difficult in the quickly changing world of emerging
communications technology, 100 but it is also true that absent a compelling
reason, the Court should make an effort to do so in order to provide clarity,
sivism, and Politicsin Casey, 42 BUFF.L. REv. 187,251 (1994) ("Traditional notions of American
stare decisis ... permit[] departure or, at the very least, reconsideration when precedent has
become unworkable, factually different, [or] eroded ....
").
98 See Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of ConstitutionalDemocracy, 64
Ci.-KmErr L. REv. 89,106 (1988) ("[lIt is the rare Supreme Court Justice who can keep up with
more than a negligible sampling of the poetry, science, economics, literature, philosophy, theology, and history that should inform an expositor of moral reality."); Ernest Young, Rediscovering
Conservatism: Burkean PoliticalTheory and ConstitutionalInterpretation, 72 N.C. L. REv.619,
635 (1994) ("In addition to the nonrepresentativeness of judges, courts have a number of other
institutional disadvantages in deciding basic social and moral issues: their information is generally limited to the facts that litigants choose to present to them; they are institutionally insulated
from the political and business worlds that give rise to the cases they hear; and their dockets are
so crowded that judges can devote little time even to critical cases."). I do not think that these
institutional limitations render courts unable to make moral judgments, but I do think they counsel in favor of caution when dealing with sensitive ethical issues.
99 See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2385-86
(1996) (plurality opinion).
100 See idat 2385 (plurality opinion) ("But no definitive choice among competing analogies
(broadcast, common carrier, bookstore) allows us to declare a rigid single standard, good for
now and for all future media and purposes.... [A]ware as we are of the changes taking place in
the law, the technology, and the industrial structure, related to telecommunications, we believe it
unwise and unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or one specific set of words now." (citation omitted)); id. at 2402 (Souter, J., concurring) ("Because we cannot be confident that for
purposes of judging speech restrictions it will continue to make sense to distinguish cable from
other technologies, and because we know that changes in these regulated technologies will enormously alter the structure of regulation itself we should be shy about saying the final word today
about what will be accepted as reasonable tomorrow."). For commentary on the difficulty in
picking analogies in the emerging technology field, see Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the FirstAmendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J.
1639 (1995), William S. Byassee, Jurisdictionof Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedentto
the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 197 (1995), 1.Trotter Hardy, The ProperLegal
Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 993 (1994), and Lawrence Lessig, The Path of
Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1745 (1995) ("[I]f we had to decide today ...just what the First
Amendment should mean in cyberspace. ...we would get it fundamentally wrong.").
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reduce decision costs, and promote rule-of-law values. 1 1 It may be the case,
as Sunstein argues, that cable regulation is not an area in which the lack of
clear rules seriously impedes planning,'02 but the case for minimalism requires more. In Denver Area, there was no risk that a maximalist ruling, such
as Justice Kennedy's characterization of public access channels as public fora
and leased access channels as common carriers, 10 3 would create a social backlash, and Justice Kennedy's clearly reasoned opinion demonstrates that the
Court could have sorted through the admittedly complex facts to reach such
a maximalist decision. Finally, if facts change, the Court can revisit the issues
without threatening stare decisis values. In short, the case for maximalism in
Denver Area was quite strong; by refusing to extend settled First Amendment
doctrine to the specific facts at issue in the case, the Court produced great
confusion where it could easily have provided clarity. Nonetheless, Justice
Breyer's frankness is admirable. One only wishes that the Court had been so
frank about its use of minimalism in a highly charged, value-laden case like
Romer, in which the arguments counseling in favor of minimalism were much
more compelling.
2. Minimalism in the Court's Portfolio
Sunstein suggests that whether the Court should employ maximalism or
minimalism in any particular case depends solely on the circumstances of that
case alone. 10 4 In other words, whether the Court should take a minimalist
path in, for example, the cable regulation context depends solely on the circumstances surrounding the cable regulation context; in determining whether
to employ minimalism, the Court should look only at whether facts in the
cable area are changing quickly and whether the need for planning in the
cable area is insistent. The Court apparently need not consider whether it
already has used minimalism in past cases or how much minimalism it already has employed in the current Term. This approach means that the
Court can use as much minimalism as it wants as long as the facts in the
particular case demand it: if thirty cases in a Term present opportunities for
minimalism, then the Court may be minimalist thirty times; if every case demands minimalism, then the Court can use minimalism every time.
This practice, however, ignores the fact that the disadvantages of
minimalism are cumulative with respect to both decision costs and rule-oflaw values. As the Court announces a greater number of minimalist decisions, the burden on lower courts and advocates rises, and one could specu101 See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text. Justices Kennedy and Thomas took this
position in Denver Area. See Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2404 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("When confronted with a threat to
free speech in the context of an emerging technology, we ought to have the discipline to analyze
the case by reference to existing elaborations of constant First Amendment principles."); id. at
2422 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing Justice
Breyer's opinion for failing to decide on a governing standard).
102 See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 32.
103 See Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2408-14 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
104 See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 30-34 (focusing on the case, situation, or area at hand).
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late that at some point these costs begin having a serious effect on the work
of these courts and practitioners. Perhaps more important, however, is the
effect of excessive minimalism upon the public's and media's perception of
the Court's legitimacy. As the examples at the beginning of this Article suggest, 10 5 when the Court employs too much minimalism-when it leaves too
many issues open in too many cases-respect for the Court declines.
Although Court-watchers may tolerate a few cautious decisions, people
mostly expect the Court to speak decisively and are troubled when the Court
wavers, refuses to answer important issues, or produces confusing
opinions.

106

This expectation means that the Court should carefully pick its spots for
minimalism. Instead of simply analyzing the case in front of it, the Court also
should consider the extent to which it has already employed minimalism in
recent cases. If the Court has issued a lot of minimalist decisions, it should
consider rendering a maximalist decision even if the need for planning is not
insistent and there are changing circumstances. A set of circumstances, when
examined in isolation, may appear favorable to minimalism, but if the Court
has already announced several minimalist decisions, another one may seriously threaten rule-of-law values and the legitimacy of the Court. In other
words, in some situations where minimalism might appear appropriate on a
micro-level, a macro-level analysis demands maximalism.107
Analyzed this way, the Court's 1995 Term looks somewhat less rosy than
Sunstein suggests (though more rosy than Taylor or Rodriguez would have us
believe' 0 8). Although the case for minimalism was perhaps quite persuasive
in Romer and BMW, both of which demanded sensitive value-based judgments, the need for minimizing minimalism counseled in favor of maximalist
decisions in other cases, such as Denver Area and 44 Liquormart. In Denver
Area, for example, the Court should have asked not only whether conditions
in the cable industry demanded minimalism, but also whether another minimalist decision was appropriate on top of minimalist cases such as Romer,
Virginia, and BMW. As it turns out, many commentators believe the Court
picked too many spots for minimalism during the 1995 Term.'0 9 If the Court
wants to use minimalism as a democracy-forcing technique to speed resolu105 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
106 See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 68. In discussing Justice Breyer's indecision in Denver
Area, Greenhouse wrote:

That is not, of course, typical Supreme Court discourse-and as a daily diet it probably should not be.... In interpreting the Constitution, where the Court can expect
to have the last word, the Justices' duty is to make every opinion "a coherent com-

munication about the Constitution," as Prof. Joseph Goldstein of Yale Law School
said in "The Intelligible Constitution".... Too much public soul-searching... can
be an obstacle to coherence.

IaL
107 This is not to say that there should be a quota for minimalism per se. Certain types of

minimalism-such as narrow, rule-like holdings-are legitimate, lawyerly, and do not threaten
rule-of-law values. The point is simply that the Court, when deciding whether to make another
decision that would create confusion and implicate rule-of-law values, should consider, in addi-

tion to other factors, whether it has already rendered many other similar decisions.
108 See Rodriguez, supra note 3; Taylor, supra note 2.
109 See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 3.
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tions of morally divisive constitutional issues, it should reserve minimalism
for cases that truly deserve it.
3. What Kind of Minimalism?
Although Sunstein describes numerous examples of judicial minimalism," 0 he does not provide much analysis of what kind of minimalism courts
should employ in any given case. The question is important because different
types of minimalism produce different results. Some types, such as denying
certiorari or dismissing for mootness, allow democratic processes to function
without interference from the judicial system, but do little to protect rights,
provide guidance to lower courts, or spur moral evolution over time. Others,
such as investigating the actual purposes of statutes, affirmatively spur democratic processes and provide some guidance and protection of rights. Still
other types, such as definitively resolving narrow issues, may provide concrete guidance for those issues but leave others untouched, allowing democratic processes to work on the unresolved issues without any judicial
guidance. This latter method is either protective of rights or not, depending
on the concrete ruling. In short, different minimalist techniques serve different functions; ideally, courts should have some idea of how to decide among
them.
Examining the various types of minimalism and developing guidelines
for when courts should employ them is a difficult task and one that is beyond
the scope both of this Article and of Sunstein's Foreword. But one question
regarding one type of judicial minimalism-namely, when should the Court
exercise passive virtues"' and deny certiorari in a case involving sensitive
moral questions upon which there is no consensus-does demand at least
some attention here.
Denying certiorari and refusing to speak on a morally charged issue is
certainly justified in certain circumstances. If the Court simply does not
think it can come to a consensus even on a narrow and shallow ruling, then
denying certiorari is appropriate. Likewise, if the Court has already rendered
a number of minimalist decisions and thinks that it could only reach a consensus on a minimalist decision in the case in question, then it may want to
refuse to hear the case in order to avoid the problems that accompany ren2
dering too many minimalist decisions.Y1
Denying certiorari as a matter of routine, however, is problematic. As
Professor Gerald Gunther argued in his compelling critique of Alexander
Bickel's The Least Dangerous Branch, the Court has an institutional obliga110 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
111 See BICKEL, supra note 46, at 111-98.
112 See supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text. I use "minimalist decision" in this context to refer to an actual written opinion that is minimalist. Refusing to hear the case is of course
also a minimalist technique so denying certiorari would not decrease the net amount of minimalism exercised. Denying certiorari, however, although admittedly exporting costs to other actors,
probably does not threaten rule-of-law values in the same way that writing numerous minimalist
opinions does.
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tion to decide important cases. 113 "[T]here is a limit," Gunther writes, "beyond which avoidance devices cannot be pressed and constitutional dicta
' 114
cannot be urged without enervating principle to an impermissible degree.
Sunstein deftly points out, however, that often the Court cannot reach deeply
principled, maximalist rulings in controversial cases."15 What, then, is the
Court to do? The answer is that it can announce minimalist decisions that
provide guidance, force democratic processes, and facilitate the move to
maximalist conditions under which the Court can follow Gunther and announce deeply principled decisions in important cases. Minimalist opinions,
then, can be understood as a compromise position somewhere between
Bickel and Gunther"16-they do not resolve difficult issues with finality, but
they do not avoid them either. Minimalist opinions allow the Court to fulfill
its institutional role, but they do not require the Court to do the impossible.
And importantly, these opinions, unlike denying certiorari, can begin an evolutionary process that will bring about maximalism along with all its advantages. 1 7 In sum, as a first step towards resolving difficult value-laden cases,
the Court should choose a minimalist technique that will facilitate the shift to
maximalism. The next section argues that intermediate scrutiny is one such
technique.
II.
A.

Intermediate Scrutiny As JudicialMinimalism

Intermediate Scrutiny and the Supreme Court

For purposes of this Article, the term "intermediate scrutiny" refers to a
level of review somewhere between strict scrutiny and rationality review that
the Court uses in an area of law where it consistently employs such tier-based
terminology. This admittedly arbitrary definition means that, for purposes of
this Article, the Court really only uses intermediate scrutiny in the Equal
Protection Clause and First Amendment contexts." 8 In the Equal Protection
113 See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and Expediency in JudicialReview, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 25 (1964).
114 Id
115 See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 30 ("[I]f minimalism is the only possible route for a
multimember tribunal, then minimalism will be inevitable.").
116 See id at 64 (arguing that in Romer it made sense "to have rendered an opinion lying
somewhere between a denial of certiorari and a fully articulated defense").
117 See supra notes 76-93 and accompanying text.
118 The definition means that, as I use it, the term "intermediate scrutiny" does not refer to
balancing modes that are used in other areas of constitutional law, which can be quite similar to
the balancing method used in the Equal Protection and First Amendment contexts. For example, at least one prominent scholar has described the Court's recent landmark Commerce Clause
decision of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), as embodying an intermediate scrutiny
test. See Richard A. Epstein, ConstitutionalFaith and the Commerce Clause,71 NoTRE DAME L.

Rnv. 167, 186-89 (1996). In the dormant Commerce ClaUse context, the balancing test the Court
has employed has also been described as an intermediate level of review. See Sullivan, supra
note 8, at 297; see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the statute
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."); Southern Pac. Co. v.

Arizona ex rel Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (striking down an Arizona statute prohibiting the
operation of trains with more than 14 passenger cars or 70 freight cars because the burden on

316
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context, the Court has applied intermediate scrutiny to laws involving affirmative action, 119 laws that discriminate on the basis of gender, 20 and occasion-

ally, laws that discriminate against aliens,' 2 ' nonmarital children, 122 and
interstate commerce was significant and the contribution to safety was "slight and dubious").
Sullivan also characterizes the Court's test for determining the constitutionality of state laws that
discriminate against nonresidents as an intermediate scrutiny test. See Sullivan, supra note 8, at
297; see also Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284-85 (1985) (holding
that New Hampshire cannot restrict the right to practice law to residents because it failed to
show "a substantial reason for the difference in treatment," which had "a substantial relationship
to the State's objective"); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 526-27, 534 (1978) (rejecting an
Alaska law giving Alaskan residents an absolute preference over nonresidents for jobs on the
Alaskan Pipeline because the state failed to show that "non-residents were 'a peculiar source of
the evil' [the law] was enacted to remedy" and that the discriminatory law would have a "substantial relationship to the particular 'evil"' (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398
(1948))).
An interesting issue, and one worth further exploration, is what these areas have in common
that might explain the existence of a three-tiered system. In other areas of constitutional law,
the Court employs general balancing tests, which are not, like intermediate scrutiny, a compromise position between two rule-like alternatives. One example is the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976), balancing test in the procedural due process context. This balancing test is not
perceived of as being transitional or unstable. Perhaps the answer to this question lies in the
concept of "suspicion." Both the antidiscrimination area and the First Amendment area involve
a suspicion of governmental motives (i.e., group-based bigotry, ideological censoring) which cannot always be explicitly discovered. The intermediate mode allows courts to closely examine
government justifications for suspect laws to discover proxies for these hard-to-find illegitimate
motives. Such a mode is not necessary, for example, in the procedural due process context,
where such suspicion generally is not present.
119 See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-68, 600 (1990) (upholding FCC minority preference policies and holding that intermediate scrutiny was applicable standard for federal
affirmative action programs), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980) (upholding a congressional requirement
that 10% of federal funds granted for local public works projects must be allocated to businesses
controlled by minority groups; at least three Justices applied intermediate scrutiny); Regents of
the Univ. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (plurality opinion) (finding University of California's racial quota system unconstitutional but finding that race can be a factor in admissions
decisions; four Justices applied intermediate scrutiny).
120 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275, 2286-87 (1996) (holding unconstitutional Virginia Military Institute's single-sex policy and applying an "exceedingly persuasive justification" variant of intermediate scrutiny); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 731 (1982) (holding that a state-sponsored nursing university could not limit its enrollment
to women because the state failed to provide an "exceedingly persuasive justification" to sustain
the classification); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (holding that the military could
authorize only registration of males for the draft because women and men are not similarly
situated for purposes of military service); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 475-76
(1981) (holding that a California statutory rape law did not unconstitutionally discriminate on
basis of gender even though only men could be held criminally liable); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199, 216-17 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding unconstitutional gender-based discrimination between widows and widowers under Social Security Act provisions); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (announcing intermediate scrutiny standard and striking down statute
prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under age 21 but females under age 18).
121 Generally, laws discriminating on the basis of alienage are subjected to strict scrutiny.
See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973) (holding that states may not prohibit resident aliens
from practicing law); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382-83 (1971) (holding that states
may not deny welfare benefits to aliens). Laws that prohibit aliens from exercising political
functions, defined broadly, however, are reviewed under a deferential standard. See Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1979) (holding that a state could bar aliens from becoming public
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individuals with mental disabilities. 123 In the First Amendment context, the
124
Court has applied intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral regulations,
time, place, and manner regulations, 125 and regulations of commercial
speech. 126 The intermediate scrutiny formulation ordinarily requires the govschool teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 300 (1978) (holding that a state could prohibit
aliens from becoming state troopers). The Court at one time explicitly applied intermediate
scrutiny to a law discriminating on the basis of alienage. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
(striking down Texas law that denied school districts funds for educating children who were
undocumented aliens). Most likely, however, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny because
the law both discriminated against a disadvantaged group and denied education, a basic right;
this decision left it unclear whether the Court in the future would apply intermediate scrutiny to
a regulation discriminating on the basis of alienage. For a critique of Plyleras indeterminate, see
Dennis J. Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe, 1982 Sup.
CT. REv. 167.
122 See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,461,465 (1988) (holding that a six-year statute of limitations on paternity claims violates the Equal Protection Clause and announcing an intermediate
scrutiny test); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275-76 (1978) (upholding a law preventing illegitimate
children from inheriting from their fathers by intestate succession unless a court made a finding
of paternity during the father's lifetime); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977) (striking
down a law completely preventing illegitimate children from inheriting by intestate succession
from their fathers).
123 The Court has explicitly held that mental retardation is not a suspect or quasi-suspect
class and that laws which discriminate against the mentally retarded do not merit heightened
scrutiny. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. 473 U.S. 432, 442-43 (1985) (noting
state's legitimate interest in treating the mentally retarded specially, the lack of antipathy towards the mentally retarded on the part of lawmakers who are addressing their plight, the political power of the group, and the line-drawing difficulties involved in identifying quasi-suspect
groups). The Court in finding unconstitutional a municipality's refusal to grant a special use
permit for the establishment of a group home for the mentally retarded, however, applied a very
heightened form of rationality review, which scholars have likened to a de facto intermediate
scrutiny standard. See id. at 446-50; Sullivan, supra note 7, at 61 n.248.
124 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1184 (1997) (upholding sections 4
and 5 of the 1992 Cable Act requiring cable television systems to dedicate channels to local
broadcast television stations); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991) (upholding
Indiana's public indecency law banning totally nude dancing in public establishments); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,386 (1968) (upholding statute criminalizing the knowing destruction or mutilation of a draft card). For a comprehensive review of the Court's treatment of
content-neutral regulations, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions, 54 U. Cm. L.
Rev. 46 (1987).
125 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (upholding a regulation
mandating the use of the city's sound-amplification guideline for concerts in a public park);
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1984) (upholding a National Park Service ban on sleeping in public parks except in designated campground areas);
Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 817 (1984) (upholding an
ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property as applied to putting up signs on
utility poles); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654
(1981) (upholding a Minnesota fair regulation prohibiting the sale or distribution of merchandise
or literature except from booths rented to applicants in a nondiscriminatory manner).
126 See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (upholding Florida Bar
Association rules prohibiting lawyers from using direct mail to solicit personal injury clients
within 30 days of an accident); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995) (finding
that Federal Alcohol Administration Act's prohibition of posting alcohol content on beer labels
was unconstitutional); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 436 (1993) (upholding
federal statutes regulating lottery broadcasting as applied to a broadcaster located in nonlottery
state but near border of lottery state); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S.
328, 344 (1986) (upholding statute restricting advertising of casino gambling to residents of Pu-
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ernment to demonstrate that the law in question serves actual,127 important1 28 governmental objectives and is closely related 129 to the achievement
of those objectives. The most striking feature of intermediate scrutiny is that,
unlike strict scrutiny or rationality review, the tier of scrutiny that the Court
decides to apply does not predetermine the outcome of the case; with inter130
mediate scrutiny, sometimes the state wins, and sometimes it loses.

erto Rico); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 571-72
(1980) (striking down regulation completely banning promotional advertising by electrical
utility).
127 In other words, post-hoc hypothesized rationales will not suffice. See United States v.
Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996) ("The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or
invented post hoc in response to litigation."); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 212-17 (1977)
(plurality opinion) (finding that the State's actual purposes in passing the statute were not the
same as those hypothesized during litigation); Trimble, 430 U.S. at 774-76 (refusing to allow a
state to hypothesize that the law in question was to enforce the presumed intention of intestate
decedents).
128 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2275 (requiring "important governmental objectives" and an
"exceedingly persuasive" justification); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990)
(requiring "important governmental objectives"), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (requiring "substantial" state interests); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (requiring "important or substantial governmental interest").
Generally, the government has had an easy time demonstrating that laws serve important or
substantial governmental interests. See Turner Broad., 117 S. Ct. at 1181 (identifying as interests
"(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the
widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair
competition in the television programming market"); Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 485 (preventing strength wars); Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 567-68 (promoting broadcast diversity); Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 796 (reducing noise); Posadas,478 U.S. at 341 (protecting health,
safety, and welfare); Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 805-07 (aesthetics); Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) (raising and supporting armies); Heffron, 452 U.S. at 649-50 (maintaining
orderly movement of crowds); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 470 (1981) (preventing illegitimate teenage pregnancy); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 381 (administrative efficiency).
In rare cases, however, the Court has found that a proffered state justification does not meet
the important or substantial interest requirement. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
116 S. Ct. 1495, 1508-10 (1996) (plurality opinion) (rejecting Rhode Island's interest in promoting temperance through keeping consumers "in the dark"); FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (rejecting a government interest in preventing noncommercial educational broadcasting stations from capture by private interest groups); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728-31 (1982) (rejecting interest in compensating for discrimination
against women in area of education in which women predominate and where such compensation
promotes traditional stereotypes); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (rejecting
interest in administrative convenience).
129 The formulation is slightly different in the Equal Protection and First Amendment contexts. In the Equal Protection context, the law must be "substantially related" to the achievement of state objectives. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2275; Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 565. In the
commercial speech context, the Court requires that the regulation "directly advance[ ] the governmental interest asserted," and that "it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. For content-neutral speech regulations, the Court
requires that the regulation further the interest and be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. For time, place, and manner restrictions,
the Court additionally requires that the speaker have adequate alternative channels for his or
her expression. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648. For an in-depth analysis of the Court's meansbased inquiry for content-neutral regulations, see Stone, supra note 124, at 48-54.
130 See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 301. In the gender area, compare Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at
2287 (state loses), with Michael M., 450 U.S. at 475-76 (state wins). In the commercial speech
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Kathleen Sullivan has argued that the Court employs intermediate scrutiny when it faces an "analogical crisis.' 131 In Professor Sullivan's terms, "[a]

set of cases comes along that just can't be steered readily onto the strict scrutiny or the rationality track,' 32 so the Court "splits the difference"'133 with
intermediate scrutiny. According to Sullivan, the Court's treatment of both
affirmative action and gender-based laws developed this way. Gender discrimination is "like race discrimination, but not exactly."' 3 4 Gender is an
immutable characteristic, and women historically have been discriminated
against; however, women are not a numerical minority in the political process, and unlike race, some gender differences relevant to law are biological
and not socially constructed.135 Likewise, affirmative action, which once received an intermediate standard of review, is like traditional race discrimination because it distinguishes among people on the basis of race, undermines
trust in meritocracy, and stigmatizes minorities, but it is also significantly different in that it helps, rather than hurts racial minorities. 136 Both instances
triggered analogical crises that required the Court to choose a standard of
review somewhere between the strict scrutiny that it uses to analyze traditional racial discrimination and the rationality review that it uses to analyze
laws distinguishing among nonsuspect classes such as "opticians, hot dog vendors, or debt adjusters."'137
Analogical crises also help explain other areas in which the Court has
employed intermediate scrutiny. For example, the Court has struggled with
the question of whether commercial speech is more like core political speech
or more like forms of speech such as obscenity and fighting words, which do
not receive First Amendment protection.138 Before 1976, it was assumed that
commercial speech should receive no special constitutional protection, 139 but
in the landmark decision of Virginia State Board of Pharmacyv. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,140 the Court thoughtfully analyzed the nature
141
of commercial speech and determined that it did deserve some protection.
Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that there are important differences between commercial speech and other types of protected speech that counsel in
favor of treating commercial speech differently than core political or artistic
speech. 142 The Court again split the difference, and when it considered the
area, compare Went for It, 515 U.S. at 635 (state wins), with Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 491
(state loses). In the content-neutral area, compare Rock Against Racism, 490 U.S. at 803 (state
wins), with United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183 (1983) (state loses).
131 Sullivan, supra note 7, at 61 n.248.
132 Sullivan, supra note 8, at 297.
133 Sullivan, supra note 7, at 61 n.248.
134 Id.
135

See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 298.

136 See id.
137 Sullivan, supra note 7, at 61 n.248.
138

See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes,and Free Speech: The Implications

of 44 Liquormart, 1996 Sup. CT. REv. 123, 127-29.
139 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942) (upholding a prohibition on the
distribution of advertising material in or upon any street).
140 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
141 See id. at 761-70.
142 See id. at 771 n.24 (noting that the truth of commercial speech is more easily verifiable
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question of commercial speech four years later, it explicitly announced that it
would apply intermediate scrutiny to regulations of advertising. 143 Likewise,
after the Court held in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.144 that it would

apply strict scrutiny to state and local affirmative action programs, 45 the analogical crisis facing the Court in the area of affirmative action was no longer
whether benign racial discrimination should be treated like harmful racial
discrimination, but whether benign racial discrimination programs implemented by Congress should be treated more like benign race-based programs
implemented by states or more like economic legislation implemented by
Congress. Again, the Court split the difference by applying intermediate
scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC;146 however, it resolved the ana-

logical crisis five years later by applying strict scrutiny to such regulations in
Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena.147
Whether the Court's treatment of content-neutral speech regulations

and time, place, and manner speech regulations has developed from an analogical crisis is a more difficult question. The Court has certainly split the
difference here too, treating content-neutral speech laws with a level of scrutiny somewhere between the scrutiny used to evaluate content-based laws 48
and laws that aim at unprotected speech. 49 But the term "crisis" implies

difficulty, and the Court mostly has been unified and consistent in treating
content-neutral and content-based laws differently, ordinarily upholding the
former and striking down the latter. 150 Although this treatment implies that
the Court has split the difference, it has really never been tempted to treat
and that commercial speech is more durable than other forms of speech and concluding that
"[e]ven if the differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and
thus subject to complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial
information is unimpaired").
143 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64
(1980).
144 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
145 See id. at 505-06.
146 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995).
147 515 U.S. at 235. There is still an open question regarding whether the standard announced in Adarand will truly turn out to be strict scrutiny in the sense that state regulations will
almost always be invalidated or whether the Court's admonition that strict scrutiny is not fatal in
fact, see id. at 237, will result in a regime similar to the pre-Croson treatment of affirmative
action programs, which Sullivan calls a regime of "de facto" intermediate scrutiny, see Sullivan,
supra note 8, at 298. The Court failed to provide an answer to this question when it denied
certiorari in the University of Texas affirmative action case. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996). For an argument that Adarand should not govern
the school context, see Akhil Amar & Neal Katyal, School Colors,NEw REPUBUC, July 17 & 24,
1995, at 24.
148 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to a content-based law).
149 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942) (finding no First
Amendment protection for fighting words).
150 Sullivan states:

Viewpoint discrimination is so clearly the cardinal First Amendment sin that legislatures now will take pains not to be caught at it....
More frequently the Court reviews laws regulating the subject matter rather
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content-neutral laws anything like content-based laws. In other words, there
is an analogical question, but no crisis. On the other hand, the Court at times
has struck down content-neutral laws' 51 and has, as Professor Geoffrey Stone
argues, applied different levels of scrutiny to different types of content-neutral regulations. 152 Moreover, the Court recently has announced a formal
level of scrutiny for content-neutral laws that exceeds the formulation traditionally used for such legislation. 153 In addition, scholars, who believe that
the state should be authorized to pass content-based regulations of speech in
order to bring about certain favored ends, have increasingly attacked the
content-neutral/content-based distinction. 54 This commentary suggests that
perhaps a crisis does indeed exist-or that one might arise soon. In the end,
though, the question is not overly important. There is surely some element
of analogical crisis in the Court's treatment of content-neutral regulations,
even if the "crisis" is not nearly as clear as it is in the case of commercial
speech or gender discrimination. And whether or not the Court actually has
understood the issue in terms of analogical crisis does not affect the normative analysis of how the Court should treat an analogical crisis if it believes
one exists. As the next two sections argue, if the Court does perceive an
analogical crisis, it can employ intermediate scrutiny as a tool to resolve the
crisis over time.

than the viewpoint of speech. These too are considered content regulation and

typically struck down....
If a challenged regulation aims at something other than content, then the
government nearly always wins.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination,Distribution and Free Speech, 37 ARiz. L. REv. 439, 446-

47 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
151 See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183 (1983) (striking down a law prohibiting displays on Supreme Court grounds as applied to public sidewalks surrounding the Court
building); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806 (1983) (striking down a requirement that

independent candidates for November elections file by March); Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76-77 (1981) (striking down an ordinance prohibiting live entertainment).
152 See Stone, supra note 124, at 48-54 (arguing that the Court sometimes evaluates content-neutral laws with deferential review and other times uses either intermediate or strict levels
of review).
153 See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 117 S. Ct. 855, 865 (1997) (injunction must burden

no more speech than necessary to achieve a significant governmental interest); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753,765 (1994) (same); see alsoTarner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (requiring that the state "demonstrate that the recited harms are real,

not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and
material way").
154 See, e.g., OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, ONLY WoRDs 3-41 (1993) (arguing in favor of legislation to prohibit pornography); MARI
J.MATSUDA ET AL., WoRDs THAT WouND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, AssAuLTrvE SPEECH,
AND Tim FIRsT AMENDMENT (1993) (arguing in favor of regulating hate speech); CAss R. SUNPROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993) (arguing in favor of contentsTErN, DEMOCRACY AND T

based regulations to promote deliberative democracy); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social

Structure,71 IowA L. REv. 1405, 1416 (1986) (arguing in favor of extending the rationale of Red
Lion).
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B. IntermediateScrutiny Is JudicialMinimalism
The critics of intermediate scrutiny have one thing right: Intermediate
scrutiny is not a deeply principled, highly theorized response to problems of
constitutional law. It is instead a compromise position that lies between two
more-or-less theorized and principled poles. Unlike strict scrutiny or rationality review, both of which predetermine the outcome of the case in front of
the Court through the application of broadly applicable, deeply theorized
principles, 155 intermediate scrutiny is a form of judicial minimalism because it
allows the Court to decide individual cases in both a narrow and a shallow
manner.

156

Intermediate scrutiny facilitates and encourages narrow decisionmaking
by requiring the Court to focus its attention on the facts of particular cases.
This practice means that each new case will generally not be predetermined
by previous cases and that the decision in any given case will not resolve
many issues in future cases. Unlike rationality review and strict scrutiny,
where the threshold decision of what level of scrutiny to apply generally controls the outcome of the case, with intermediate scrutiny the real work comes
after the Court makes its initial threshold decision on the standard of review. 157 The Court must ask specific questions about the case at hand: What
are the state interests that allegedly justify the law? What is the means-end
relationship between the law and the state interests? Are there alternative
channels of communication available? The Court also asks these questions
with strict scrutiny, but the answers rarely matter. With intermediate scrutiny,
the answers to these questions really do matter, and therefore midlevel review focuses the Court's attention on the particular case in front of it and
renders the Court's decision binding on only a narrow range of potential fact
situations.
A comparison of the Court's treatment of laws regulating commercial
speech and laws regulating political speech illustrates this point. When dealing with restrictions on core political speech, the Court early on decided upon
a broadly applicable and deeply theorized principle: As Justice Brennan
stated in Texas v. Johnson,158 "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreea155 Examples of such principles are that government cannot ban political or artistic speech
because of its content, that government cannot discriminate on the basis of race, or that government can regulate purely economic actors as long as it acts rationally.
156 See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 15, 20. Notably, intermediate scrutiny is not minimalism
because it is a standard rather than a rule; both standards and rules can be minimalistic. See id.
at 42-43.
157 Sullivan states:
Like the poles of two-tier review, [intermediate scrutiny] employs the vocabulary of
weights and measures as a metaphor for justification. But unlike two-tier review, it
really means it. TWo-tier review, like overtly taxonomic or categorical analysis... uses classification at the threshold to cut off further serious debate: "this is
an x case and therefore the government (or rightholder) wins." Intermediate scrutiny requires far more evaluative work after the threshold has been crossed.
Sullivan, supra note 8, at 300-01.

158

491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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ble."'159 When the Court makes the threshold decision that a law is a contentbased regulation of core speech, it almost invariably employs this principle to
strike the legislation. 160 But once the Court decides that a law infringes upon
commercial speech, it carefully analyzes the particular circumstances of the
case to determine if the law is constitutional. For example, in Coors Brewing,
the Court closely examined the state's interests in suppressing alcohol
strength wars (important) and facilitating state efforts to regulate alcohol
under the Twenty-first Amendment (not sufficiently important). 161 It also examined the government's entire alcohol regulatory scheme, evidence demonstrating a link between the labeling ban and decreased strength wars, and
potential alternatives to the labeling ban in deciding that the law in question
did not pass intermediate scrutiny.' 62 Similarly, the Court in United States v.
Edge BroadcastingCo.' 63 analyzed both the federal interest in balancing the
interests of lottery and nonlottery states and whether the law as applied to
the particular plaintiff was more extensive than necessary. 164 For this latter
inquiry, the Court analyzed specific data regarding the number of North Carolina residents who could potentially have constituted the plaintiff radio station's audience, the percentage of radio listening time taken up by these
residents, the percentage of North Carolina residents in counties reached by
plaintiff's signal who watched Virginia television stations, and other statistics
uniquely relevant to the case.' 65 The decision in Edge Broadcasting-that
159 Id. at 414. For an earlier statement of this principle, see Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."). See
also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,

115-16 (1991) ("This is a notion so engrained in our First Amendment jurisprudence that last
Term we found it so 'obvious' as to not require explanation. It is but one manifestation of a far
broader principle: 'Regulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the
content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment."' (citation omitted)

(quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984))).
160 See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990) (striking down The Flag
Protection Act of 1989); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (reversing a flag burning
conviction under Texas flag desecration statute); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (strik-

ing down a regulation prohibiting the display within 500 feet of a foreign embassy of any sign
that tends to bring the foreign government into disrepute); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
276-77 (1981) (finding unconstitutional a university policy prohibiting use of university buildings

or grounds for purposes of religious teaching or worship); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471
(1980) (holding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting picketing of residences or dwellings but
exempting peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute); Mosley, 408
U.S. at 94 (holding unconstitutional an ordinance prohibiting all picketing within 150 feet of a

school, except peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute). But see Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding a law prohibiting the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance

to a polling place).
161 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485-86 (1995).
162 See id. at 486-91.
163

509 U.S. 418 (1993).

164

See id at 425-35.

See id. at 429-35. The Court's most recent Turner Broadcasting decision also exemplifies the fact-intensive nature of intermediate scrutiny. As one example of how the Court is
willing to look at case-specific statistics to determine the constitutional outcome of a case, the
Court in Turner Broadcastingcited statistics showing that under the must-carry rules, cable oper165
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Congress's decision to prohibit broadcasters in nonlottery states from broadcasting lottery advertisements was constitutional as applied to the particular
North Carolina plaintiff' 66 -is a very narrow one and one that might come
out differently in a case involving slightly different facts. This narrowness is a
hallmark of the intermediate scrutiny mode.
Intermediate scrutiny is also clearly shallow rather than deep in the

sense that it reflects a "crisis in analogical reasoning"'167 rather than a deeply

theorized principle. 168 The Court applies strict scrutiny to content-based re-

strictions of political speech because of the principle that government may
not distort the marketplace of ideas; likewise, the Court applies rationality

review to laws that distinguish among economic actors because of the principle that government must have broad authority to regulate business affairs.

69

Both of these ideas, while perhaps not reaching the heights of philosophical
7
principles like the categorical imperative

70

or the difference principle,' '

surely represent two of the most well-thought-out and deeply theorized principles in constitutional law. No such principles animate the Court's use of
intermediate scrutiny. It uses intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech
because commercial speech is like political speech, but also like forms of unprotected speech. It uses intermediate scrutiny for regulations that discriminate on the basis of gender because these regulations are like those that

discriminate on the basis of race, but also resemble those that discriminate on
the basis of economic affiliation. Because there is no deeply theorized principle that supports the intermediate scrutiny mode itself, the individual cases
involving intermediate scrutiny also do not reflect any deep principle. The
Court's decisions to uphold a law banning lottery advertising within nonlottery states but to strike down a law prohibiting beer manufacturers from putting the beer's alcohol content on the bottle reflect no profound perspective

on the authority of the state or the inalienability of certain civil or human
rights. The decisions simply reflect the Court's judgment that in one case the

state justified the law well enough and in the other it fell a little short.
ators satisfied their obligations 87% of the time using previously unused channel capacity, that
94.5% of cable systems had not had to drop any programming in order to fulfill these obligations, that the remaining 5.5% of cable systems had to drop only an average of 1.22 services, that
cable operators nationwide carry 99.8% of the programming they carried before the must-carry
rules, and that only 1.18% of nationwide cable channels are devoted to channels added because
of must-carry. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1198 (1997).
166 See Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 435.
167 See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 297.
168 Sunstein argues that one mark of minimalism is analogical reasoning as opposed to reasoning based on abstract theories. See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 14.
169 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("The day is
gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down
state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.").
170 See IMMANUEL KANT,FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 46-47 (Lewis
White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1959) (1785) (stating that one should act only according to
a maxim that one can will as a universal law).
171 See JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JusTrCE 75-78 (1971) (economic and social inequalities
are only justified if the inequalities help the least well off in society).
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As a form of judicial minimalism, intermediate scrutiny brings with it
both the advantages and disadvantages of minimalism. The next section discusses the advantages in some detail and argues that in some cases they outweigh the disadvantages, but it is worth pausing here to recall these
disadvantages. When the Court employs intermediate scrutiny, it certainly
exports decision costs to other actors. Because the test is indeterminate, it
causes confusion among lower courts and practitioners.172 It also requires
intensively fact-oriented decisionmaking that increases the amount of time
and money that lawyers must spend to litigate cases as well as the amount of
time and effort that judges must spend to resolve the cases. 173 Finally, the
Court's use of intermediate scrutiny makes it vulnerable to charges of ad hoc
decisionmaking. 174 Because the text is so elastic, it can appear that the Justices are simply applying it to reach whatever decision they want. As Sullivan
puts it, "No amount of bureaucratic lingo in the formulas of intermediate
scrutiny... can wholly dispel that Lochnerian feeling one can get from intermediate scrutiny's shifting bottom line."' 75 The case for intermediate scrutiny recognizes these problems but realizes that in situations of analogical
crisis it may nevertheless be the best of all possible options.
C. The Advantages of IntermediateScrutiny
1.

The Best Possible Alternative

Intermediate scrutiny is well-suited for use in situations of analogical crisis because it is a cautious, flexible doctrine that acknowledges both the difficulty of resolving divisive moral issues and the fallibility of individual judges.
As this Article suggests,'176 the Court should reserve minimalist techniques
for cases involving controversial moral uncertainty. Situations of analogical
crisis certainly meet this criteria as they involve some of the most difficult
questions in all of constitutional law. Unfortunately, judges are not ideally
equipped to solve these challenging questions quickly and thoroughly in accordance with deeply-theorized principles. 177 Judges are all too human, and
though one may legitimately expect them to speak authoritatively on subjects
such as statutory interpretation and courtroom procedure, which are
uniquely within the judicial domain, asking them to resolve our most intricate
moral disputes in one fell swoop simply is asking too much. Intermediate
scrutiny allows judges to take their time with these questions and is therefore
the most realistic and desirable alternative for dealing with analogical crisis.
The other alternatives for dealing with analogical crisis are deeply problematic. One can imagine at least three major alternatives to applying an
intermediate level of review. First, the Court could exercise its passive vir172 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
173 See, e.g., Turner Broad. v. FCC, 910 F. Supp. 734, 739-40 (D.D.C. 1995) (noting the
18,000 pages of congressional hearings as well as additional evidence that was before the court

on remand after the Supreme Court announced that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate
standard for reviewing the must-carry legislation), affd, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997).

174 See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
175 Sullivan, supra note 8, at 301 (footnote omitted).
176 See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.

177 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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tues, deny certiorari, and put the crisis off indefinitely. Second, it could abandon the strict tier system and implement an explicit sliding scale, h la Justices
Marshall and Stevens 178 for Equal Protection and other areas of constitutional law. Finally, the Court could resolve the crisis immediately by announcing a maximalist rule. In other words, it could apply either rationality
review or strict scrutiny to the particular type of regulation in question. All
of these alternatives carry serious problems and in most cases are inferior to
intermediate scrutiny.
First, as noted above, 179 routinely denying certiorari is not an appropriate method for addressing important cases. Although the Court must exercise the passive virtues even in some important, divisive cases, it has an
institutional obligation to give guidance to lower courts, to resolve circuit
splits, and to speak to significant constitutional issues. Denying certiorari
leaves lower courts confused and can result in different circuits applying different interpretations of the same constitutional provision. In these circumstances, denying certiorari can be, as Taylor says, "an abdication of
responsibility."''8 0 The length of time it takes a case to work its way to the
Supreme Court exacerbates these problems. When the Court initially refuses
to decide an issue in one particular case, it may be years before the Court has
the opportunity to address the issue again. 18' Therefore, because denying
178 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451-55 (1985)
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Olur cases reflect a continuum of judgmental responses to differing
classifications which have been explained in opinions by terms ranging from 'strict scrutiny' at
one extreme to 'rational basis' at the other. I have never been persuaded that these so-called
'standards' adequately explain the decisional process."); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12
(1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every
State to govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some
cases and a different standard in other cases."); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 97-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("A principled reading of what this Court has
done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly
violative of [equal protection]. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of
care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the
constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.").
179 See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
180 Stuart Taylor Jr., Closing Argument: Maybe the Supremes Did the Right Thing, TEx.
LAWYER, July 15, 1996, at 27 (concluding that although denying certiorari is problematic, it was
probably justified in Hopwood); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Decline Affirmative-Action
Case, N.Y. TIMEs, July 2, 1996, at A12 (noting that education lawyers and officials expressed
consternation at the Court's refusal to hear the Hopwood case). For more on Hopwood, see
infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text. Perhaps the Court's most infamous refusal to hear a
case was its dismissal of Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va.), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985
(1956), involving the validity of the Virginia miscegenation statute, which the Court eventually
invalidated in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). The Naim dismissal, which was made
more controversial by the fact that the Court refused to exercise mandatory appellate jurisdiction over the case, was criticized harshly. See Gunther, supra note 113, at 11-13; Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 34 (1959) (calling the
dismissal "wholly without basis in the law"). But see BICKEL, supra note 46, at 174 (defending
the dismissal in Naim).
181 See Taylor, supra note 180 ("[I]t will probably take at least four years for another university admissions case to make its way to the court and present the justices with another opportunity to resolve the state of confusion they have helped create.").
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certiorari at best seriously delays guidance from the Court and at worse delays it indefinitely, it is ordinarily not a suitable response to analogical crisis.
Second, the sliding-scale approach of Justices Stevens and Marshall is
also not an appropriate solution to analogical crisis. Although it is true that
intermediate scrutiny is fairly indeterminate and may, in some cases, threaten
rule-of-law values, adopting a sliding scale surely would exacerbate these disadvantages to the point where the disadvantages would outweigh any possible advantages that the sliding scale may have over the current three-tier
system. 182 As this Article suggests, a Court that employs too much minimalism places a large burden on lower courts and practitioners and threatens its
own legitimacy. 8 3 Implementation of a sliding-scale balancing test for all
Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment cases would remove the clarity that the strict scrutiny and rationality review tiers provide for most cases
arising under these clauses, and would require lawyers and courts to analyze
intensively the facts of each new case without much guidance from previous
cases. This approach inevitably would increase decision costs and bring criticism upon the Court. By maintaining the traditional tiered system and reserving judicial minimalism for cases involving substantial value-based
uncertainty, the Court can keep these costs to a minimum. Once again, the
selective use of intermediate scrutiny is a superior option.
Finally, it is impossible for the Court to resolve adequately a true analogical crisis by announcing a maximalist rule after a single case. Three of the
most notorious problems with rules are that they are under- and overinclusive with respect to the ends that they are meant to realize, that they make it
difficult to react to changes over time, and that their rigidity guarantees injustice in some situations.184 Although in some cases the advantages of rulebased decisionmaking (certainty and predictability) 185 will outweigh these
disadvantages, the disadvantages usually will outweigh when the Court confronts a situation as complex and prone to change as an analogical crisis.
First, in situations of analogical crisis the Court cannot possibly predict the
precise contours of the problem that it seeks to address, and this nearly guarantees that a broad rule will turn out to fit the problem with a great degree of
inexactitude. Second, the moral flux and uncertainty inherent in a situation
of analogical crisis make it probable that the rule will become less appropriate over time. Third, many people will find a broad rule unjust and unfair
because people disagree about basic values in situations involving analogical
crisis. This situation can cause, as Professor Sunstein notes, "an intense so182 Sunstein, in addressing the sliding-scale approach, states:

But a general movement in the direction of balancing would be nothing to celebrate. The use of "tiers" has two important goals. The first is to ensure that courts
are most skeptical in cases in which it is highly predictable that illegitimate motives
are at work ....
The second goal of a tiered system is to discipline judicial discretion
while promoting planning and predictability for future cases. Without tiers, it
would be difficult to predict judicial judgments under the Equal Protection Clause,
and judges would make decisions based on ad hoc assessments of the equities.
Sunstein, supra note 42, at 78.
183 See supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text.
184 See SuNsTEiN, supra note 7, at 130-35.
185 See supra note 7.
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cial backlash" and may "hinder social deliberation, learning, compromise,
and moral evolution over time."'1 86 Generally, some mixture of the second
and third situations will exist. Either the Court will face immediate criticism
or it will encounter increasing criticism as moral values change. Either way,
changing circumstances will force the Court either to keep a bad rule or to

overrule itself wholly or partially. Both of these possibilities threaten to undermine the legitimacy of the Court 87
Some of the most vilified decisions in the Court's history have been ones

in which the Court has attempted to resolve a divisive moral issue with a
maximalist rule. This situation has occurred both when the Court has favored the state and when it has favored rightholders. The latter category
contains both Lochner v. New York' 88 and Roe v. Wade,189 both of which

were either limited or overruled by later cases. 190 The former category includes such condemned decisions as Plessy v. Ferguson'9 ' and Goesaert v.
Cleary,192 and perhaps even Bowers v. Hardwick.'93 The Court has regretted

few phrases more than "[i]f one race be inferior to the other socially, the
Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane,' '

4

or "we cannot give ear to the suggestion that the real impulse behind this
legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to try to monopolize the calling."'1 95 The Court may soon-if it has not already-come to re-

gret its conclusion in Hardwick that "to claim that a right to engage in
[homosexual] conduct is... 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at
Sunstein, supra note 42, at 33.
Of course, this is not to say that the Court should not generally uphold laws if it is
simply unsure about whether the law is constitutional. In other words, the Court's general presumption that popularly passed laws are constitutional is still a sound one. The only caveat to
this is in cases of true analogical crisis, where a maximalist decision either striking or upholding
the law risks serious consequences. The trick is to recognize those rare circumstances. For some
thoughts on how the Court should do this, see infra Part IV.
188 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner is, of course, one of the most highly criticized of all the
Court's decisions. See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONoMIc LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 23
(1980) ("Lochner... is one of the most condemned cases in United States history and has been
used to symbolize judicial dereliction and abuse." (footnote omitted)).
189 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For an example of the criticism of Roe, see John Hart Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (arguing that Roe
may be a more dangerous precedent than Lochner).
190 Lochner was overruled. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937);
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Roe has been limited. See Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (announcing the "undue burden" test).
191 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Of course, Plessy was overruled. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
186
187

U.S. 483 (1954).
192 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding Michigan law denying bartender licenses to females who
were not wives or daughters of male tavern owners). Goesearthas been overruled. See Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23 (1976) (explicitly disapproving of Goeseart).
193 See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 68 (calling Bowers v. Hardwick "one of the most vilified
decisions since World War II" (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEx
MARRIAGE 250 n.31 (1996), Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737, 770,
799-801 (1989), and Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedentby PersonalPredilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 648, 655-56 (1987))).
194 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552.
195 Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 467. See also United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275
(1996) (criticizing this quotation).
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best, facetious."'1 96 Rigid and broad rules in conditions of moral flux, as these

cases demonstrate, have often returned to haunt the Court. This is not to say
that the Court should not announce broad rules when moral imperatives are
clear (as in the case of racial discrimination even in the nineteenth century)rather it means that the Court must proceed cautiously in situations of moral
uncertainty and that generally, rules will not do, at least as a first attempt to
solve a divisive analogical crisis.
Intermediate scrutiny, then, is generally a better solution to analogical
crisis than denying certiorari, implementing a sliding-scale approach, or announcing a maximalist rule. It allows the Court to provide some guidance to
lower courts and practitioners, thereby fulfilling its institutional role, but it
does not commit the Court to a rigid position that it may eventually regret.
For example, consider how the Court could have used intermediate scrutiny
in Hopwood v. Texas.197 Taylor has argued that although the Court's refusal
to hear the case "sowed confusion," "left institutions in different states subject to disparate interpretations of the Constitution," and probably guaranteed that the Justices will have to wait years for another opportunity to
"resolve the state of confusion they have helped create,' 198 the Court nevertheless acted correctly because any "climactic decision" in the case "could
have pre-empted evolutionary, democratic decision-making on an issue of vital national importance as to which the country and the court alike are deeply
divided."' 199 Taylor's fears about the possible effects of a climactic decision
are completely warranted, as the discussion above suggests 200 But Taylor
wrongly assumes that the only viable alternative to a climactic decision is to
deny certiorari. Instead, the Court could have taken the case and explicitly
applied an intermediate standard of review to affirmative action programs in
the public education context. This would have signaled to school administrators and lower courts that the Court will continue to analyze carefully these
programs according to the particular circumstances of each case. The Court
would have provided guidance in an area desperately in need of direction but
would not have pre-empted democratic deliberation or moral evolution over
time.201 In fact, the next section argues that an intermediate level of review
actually could have spurred democratic deliberation and moral evolution towards a societal consensus on affirmative action, allowing the Court to an196 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
197 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
198 Taylor, supra note 180.
199 Id.

200 See supra notes 184-196 and accompanying text.
201 Taylor argues that even the most narrow of decisions upholding racial preferences in
admissions would be unfortunate because it would signal to administrators that they could continue to aim for a "racial-balance-at-any-cost bottom line," Taylor, supra note 180, but it is unclear why this would be the case if the Court clearly held that preference programs must serve
important interests and be closely tailored to the achievement of those interests. Taylor argues
that Bakke caused administrators to implement programs that essentially establish race-based

quotas for university admissions, see id., but this simply proves the point. Bakke was a confused
opinion with no clear majority; its very confusion is what requires the Court to take up the
question again to provide guidance. If the Court had taken Hopwood and clearly noted the

limits of race-based admission preference programs, it would likely have deterred administrators
from designing programs similar in effect to quota systems.
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nounce a "climactic" decision without worrying about inciting a social
backlash or undermining its legitimacy as the final arbiter of the Constitution.
2. Resolving Analogical Crises
The previous section argued that intermediate scrutiny is an appropriate
response to analogical crisis because it allows the Court to provide guidance
without committing itself to any rigid rule that it may later regret. This
means that in any particular case involving a true analogical crisis, intermediate scrutiny is a better option than either denying certiorari or announcing a
maximalist rule. But a perpetual regime of intermediate scrutiny in any area
of constitutional law is not an ideal solution. As noted above, judicial
minimalism and intermediate scrutiny have problems of their own,202 and a
Court that applies too much minimalism for too long will inevitably subject
itself to much well-deserved criticism. The Court ideally should apply a technique in situations of analogical crisis that will realize the short-term advantages of minimalism while facilitating a long-term shift to conditions favoring
maximalism. In other words, the Court should attempt to resolve the analogical crisis incrementally over time. The remainder of this section argues that
intermediate scrutiny is a dynamic and evolutionary doctrine that can help
the Court achieve this important goal.
Intermediate scrutiny can help the Court resolve analogical crises
through two similar, yet distinct, mechanisms. The first mechanism is an "internal" mechanism that focuses on how the Court can educate itself on the
complex parameters of the analogical crisis. The second mechanism is a "dialogic" mechanism that focuses on how the Court, by applying intermediate
scrutiny in a situation of analogical crisis, can instigate a dialogue among itself, its coordinate branches of government, and society at large in order to
reach a consensus on resolving the crisis over time. These mechanisms help
facilitate the shift to maximalism by responding to independent reasons why
the Court should not apply maximalist solutions to analogical crises in the
first place. Maximalist rules do not work in situations of analogical crisis
because (1) it is unlikely that the Court can comprehend fully the contours of
the analogical crisis in such a way that it can adequately resolve the issue on
the first try and (2) the divisive nature of the moral issue at stake in the
analogical crisis guarantees that any rule will meet great resistance. The internal mechanism for change responds to the first of these problems; the dialogic mechanism responds to the second.
The internal mechanism works in at least four interrelated ways. First
and most simply, by applying intermediate scrutiny in an analogical crisis
with the ultimate goal of resolving the crisis, the Court buys itself more time
to consider the various issues raised by the crisis. The Court essentially can
place a particular type of legislation in a holding pattern, during which it can
consider the issues more fully. Because intermediate scrutiny does not guarantee victory to either the individual litigant or the state, it guarantees that
litigants will bring more cases than if the Court had announced a strict or
rationality level of review. The Court can take advantage of these cases by
202

See supra notes 21-28, 59-63, 104-107, 172-175 and accompanying text.
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accepting some of them and expanding its knowledge about the area in question. For example, in the commercial speech area, the Court has explored
such questions as whether a city can distinguish between on- and off-site advertising,20 3 whether advertisements for "vice"-related products and services
(such as liquor and gambling) can be treated differently from other types of
advertisements, 204 and what exactly constitutes commercial speech. 20 5 Undoubtedly, by considering the variety of issues raised by regulations of commercial speech, the Court can better understand its importance, its nature,
and its scope. This experience will assist the Court in ultimately deciding
whether commercial speech should be treated more like core political speech
or more like, for example, fighting words and obscenity.
Second, by requiring a detailed and individualized consideration of both
the ends and means-end relationship of a challenged regulation, intermediate
scrutiny, as Sullivan says, "call[s] forth more explicit articulation on both the
rights and interests side. ' '20 6 This means that the Court will have an opportunity to consider the various interests that regulations of commercial speech
might serve as well as the reasons that might justify broad protection of commercial speakers' First Amendment rights. By applying an intermediate level
of review, which requires litigants to demonstrate carefully why the facts in
their particular case either justify or do not justify regulation, the Court can
evaluate critically the specific ramifications of commercial regulations, what
goals they serve, and how well they serve them. This process can create a
more concrete as well as a more nuanced understanding of the area that inevitably will assist the Justices in developing a resolution of the analogical crisis.
Third, by encouraging more litigation in the area covered by the crisis,
the Court can ensure a number of lower-court cases to illuminate the relevant issues. In this sense, applying intermediate scrutiny brings with it advantages similar to those arising from "percolation," a term that refers to the
practice of denying certiorari until several circuit courts have considered an
issue. 207 According to defenders of percolation, or "percolationists," 20 8 this
practice improves the Court's decisionmaking process in two important ways.
First, the Court can benefit from the reasoning of lower courts and from lawyers who have tested their arguments in these courts. When the Supreme
Court finally does hear the case, it can read these opinions in order to grasp
better the issues and render the best possible decision. 20 9 Second, percola203 See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510-12 (1981) (plurality opinion) (concluding that city may constitutionally distinguish between on- and off-site advertising).

204 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1513 (1996) (finding that no
vice exception applies to price advertising ban); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co.,
478 U.S. 328, 346-47 (1986) (indicating that because the state could outright ban the "deemed

harmful" activity, it may permit the activity with restrictions on the activity's advertising).
205 See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 492-94 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that a statement of alcohol strength on a beer label is not commercial speech).
206 Sullivan, supra note 8, at 313.
207 See Todd J. Tiberi, Comment, Supreme Court Denials of Certiorariin Conflicts Cases:

Percolationor Procrastination?,54 U. Prrr. L. Rlv. 861, 861 & n.3 (1993).
208 See id. at 864.
209 See, e.g., COMrNSSION ON REVISION OF TH FED. COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, HEARINGS: SECOND PHASE 1974-1975, at 793 (1974) ("It may be preferable to allow the circuits to
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tion allows the various circuits to act as laboratories where the results of dif-

ferent legal doctrines can be observed and evaluated. When the Court
eventually decides the issue, it can look to these different laboratories and
choose the best solution.210 Critics of percolation have argued that percolation does not produce better Supreme Court opinions either because the
Court actually does not read lower-court opinions or because the opinions
have little to offer.211 These criticisms, although somewhat persuasive, do not
defeat the case for percolation in the intermediate scrutiny context. First,
even critics of percolation tend to defend it in constitutional cases.21 2 Percolation is particularly beneficial when addressing cases involving analogical
crisis, which are often the most difficult and controversial constitutional cases
the Court hears. Second, the argument that the Court does not read lowercourt opinions does not defeat the normative argument that the Court should
experiment with a variety of solutions to a difficult legal problem than to rush in with a binding
national rule as soon as a conflict, or the potential of a conflict, develops. By resolving the
problem at a later date, one may have more confidence in the wisdom of the result and more
certainty that it will endure."); RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: C iSIS AND REFORM 163 (1985) (arguing that difficult issues are more likely to be answered correctly after
"different sets of judges" have considered it); Paul M. Bator, What Is Wrong with the Supreme
Court?, 51 U. Prr. L. REv. 673, 689-90 (1990) (expressing doubts about the benefits of percolation but noting that "of course it ought to be true that solutions arrived at after experimental and
tentative answers are reached elsewhere will be better solutions because they will be based on
more information and a wider range of consideration"); Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A
ManagerialTheory of the Supreme Court's Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 681, 719 (1984) ("The views of the lower courts on a particular legal issue provide the
Supreme Court with a means of identifying significant rulings as well as an experimental base
and a set of doctrinal materials with which to fashion sound binding law."); Sanford Caust-Ellenbogen, Note, Using Choice of Law Rules to Make IntercircuitConflicts Tolerable, 59 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1078, 1080 (1984) ("[W]hen a court faces a particular issue, it may benefit from the
reasoning of courts that have previously confronted the same issue."); Tiberi, supra note 207, at
864 (concluding that percolation is not beneficial but describing the percolationist's argument as:
"The more attorneys who have briefed and argued an issue, and the more judges who have
decided it, the better will be the decision from the Supreme Court. This is so because numerous
arguments will have been advanced, and judges will have either accepted or rejected them, all
the while providing their reasons for doing so").
210 See, e.g., J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of IntercircuitConflicts: A Solution
Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 913, 929 (1983) ("The many circuit courts
act as the 'laboratories' of new or refined legal principles... providing the Supreme Court with a
wide array of approaches to legal issues and thus, hopefully, with the raw material from which to
fashion better judgments." (footnote omitted)); Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 209, at 1080-81
("[P]ercolation allows different legal standards to operate simultaneously, so that the practical
implications of each standard may emerge. The circuits become laboratories where different
legal rules can be tested.").
211 See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a New National
Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1400, 1408 (1987) (finding the percolation rationale unpersuasive);
Bator, supra note 209, at 689-91 (arguing that better solutions resulting from percolation only
happen "if the experience generated during percolation process is both enlightening and communicated to the ultimate decider" and expressing skepticism that both are true); Daniel J. Meador,
A Challenge to JudicialArchitecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CH. L. REv. 603, 634 (1989) (calling percolation a "euphemism for incoherence").
212 See Meador, supra note 211, at 633 ("[The percolation] argument has its greatest force
in relation to constitutional questions."); Tiberi, supra note 207, at 870 ("[M]ost commentators
on percolation, even nonpercolationists, agree that percolation is generally a good idea in constitutional cases.").
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read them.213 Finally, it makes intuitive sense that if the Court did study
lower-court cases governed by intermediate scrutiny, it would gain a deeper
appreciation for the various state interests and countervailing rights involved
and would be able to better assess the relationship between different types of
regulations and those interests and rights. Even if this benefit is modest, reviewing lower-court cases surely can help the Court to understand more thoroughly the contours of the analogical crisis that it seeks to resolve.
Finally, by leaving issues open, the Court invites scholarly commentary
on the issue that it can use in the same way it can use lower-court opinions.
Although some judges have explicitly stated that law review articles generally
do not help them, 214 controversial issues of constitutional law, such as those
arising under an analogical crisis, have motivated top scholars to contribute
opinions upon which the Court can draw to hone its thinking about the issues. It appears that the Supreme Court cites law review articles far more
often than lower courts do,215 and it also appears that the Court frequently
has cited important articles in cases involving analogical crisis. 2 16 Moreover,
law review articles also may indirectly help the Court by assisting lower-court
213 Whether the Court does read these opinions, and to what degree, is unknown. Interviews with Justices and clerks, however, have indicated that the Justices believe percolation is
important and that they are interested in lower court cases and law review articles. See H.W.

PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE

210-30 (1991). Moreover, there is some evidence that lower

court opinions help mold the thinking of lawyers before the Court; this suggests that lower court
cases may also have an indirect effect on the Court. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 27 n.20,
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (No. 93-1631) (discussing eight state and lower
federal court cases dealing with the relationship between advertising regulation and decreased
consumption of alcohol); Brief for the Petitioners, United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S.
418 (1993) (No. 92-486) (citing 12 lower court cases decided after Virginia State Board of Pharmacy on a variety of issues).
214 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Profession, 38
J. LEGAL EDUC. 285, 285 (1988) (arguing that there is a great gulf between legal academics on
the one hand and lawyers and judges on the other); Patricia M. Wald, Teaching the Trade: An
Appellate Judge's View of Practice-OrientedLegal Education, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 35, 42 (1986)
(arguing that law review articles are generally not helpful for appellate decisionmaking). On the
use of law review articles by courts, see generally, Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges
and Scholars: Do Courts and Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI.KENr L. REv. 871 (1996), and Max Stier et al., Law Review Usage and Suggestionsfor Inprovement: A Survey of Attorneys, Professors,and Judges, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1467 (1992).
215 See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States
Courts of Appeals: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1051, 1052 (1991) (noting that
the Supreme Court is "far more disposed to cite law reviews" than the courts of appeals and
"[o]n average, 100 Supreme Court opinions will contain 138 citations, while 100 circuit court
opinions will contain eighteen citations").
216 This is probably most true in the context of affirmative action. For example, John Hart
Ely's classic article The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination,41 U. Cm. L. REv.
723 (1974), has been cited in five of the most important Supreme Court affirmative action cases.
See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 n.14 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496
(1989) (plurality opinion); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 199 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion);
Regents of the Univ. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 288 n.25 (1978) (plurality opinion). Terrance
Sandalow's article RacialPreferencesin Higher Education: PoliticalResponsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 653 (1975) has been cited twice. See Metro, 497 U.S. at 565 n.12;
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288 n.25. Kent Greenawalt's article Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial
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judges and lawyers who argue before the Court. In short, law review articles,
like lower-court opinions, the passage of time, and the requirement that litigants articulate rights and interests with particularity should theoretically assist the Court in familiarizing itself with the relevant analogical crisis and
developing more confidence that it can satisfactorily resolve the crisis.
Intermediate scrutiny also can speed the resolution of an analogical crisis through its dialogic mechanism. This mechanism itself works in two different, yet interrelated, ways. First, by applying intermediate scrutiny, the
Court signals to law-making bodies that they must carefully consider the justifications for regulating in a particular area. Second, by sending a symbolic
message to society at-large, the Court can help focus public attention on the
issue in question, spur debate about the types of state action involved, and
perhaps instigate a change in social attitudes. By forcing public conversation
about the analogical crisis, the Court can increase the chances that society
will move towards consensus, thus decreasing moral uncertainty and laying
the groundwork for maximalism.
The Court can affect the work of legislatures by requiring them to pay
careful, explicit attention to the justifications of the laws they seek to implement. Because the intermediate scrutiny standard requires law-making bodies to justify their regulation in terms of actual purposes, it forces them to
articulate clearly the interests that the law is intended to serve. It requires
legislatures to make these interests explicit, thereby improving the democratic process and inviting debate about the true motivations for legislation.2 17 Moreover, by requiring law-making bodies to prove that a particular
law directly advances these interests, intermediate scrutiny forces them to
consider carefully whether and how well the proposed law will actually work.
Presumably, legislatures will only persist in regulating the relevant area if
they truly believe the regulations are justified. Intermediate scrutiny therefore indirectly forces legislatures to take a position on the analogical crisis.
The Court can then respond to a particular legislature's decision. If the legislature continues to persist in attempting to regulate the given area, the Court
may feel that it should resolve the crisis through rationality review; if the
legislature relents by regulating less, the Court may become convinced that
the trend is towards recognizing a right that should be protected with strict
scrutiny. In essence, the Court starts the interbranch conversation by signaling to the legislature that a certain type of law is suspect. The legislature can
then respond as it sees fit, and the dialogue continues from there.2 18
Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 559 (1975) has been cited twice. See
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 n.6; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288 n.25.
Likewise, the Court has cited important articles in the commercial speech context. For example, the classic article by Thomas H. Jackson and John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech:
Economic Due Processand the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979), has been cited three
times. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340 n.7 (1986); Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980); Friedman v. Rog-

ers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979).
See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 36-39.
Many constitutional scholars have argued that the Court's most important role is to
engage in a dialogue with lower courts, the other branches of government, and society as a
whole. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALrrY OF CONSENT 111 (1975) (noting that
217

218

Defending the Middle Way

1998]

In addition to the purely legal requirements that intermediate scrutiny
places upon legislatures, intermediate scrutiny also sends an important symbolic message to the other branches of government that similarly can instigate interbranch dialogue. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg-whose pioneering
Supreme Court litigation first persuaded the Court to adopt an intermediate
standard of review for statutes discriminating on the basis of gender-defended the Court's use of intermediate scrutiny in essentially these terms:
In a core set of cases... dealing with social insurance benefits for a
worker's spouse or family, the decisions did not utterly condemn the
legislature's product. Instead, the Court, in effect, opened a dialogue with the political branches of government. In essence, the
Court instructed Congress and state legislatures: rethink ancient positions on these questions. Should you determine that special treatment for women is warranted,...

we have left you a corridor in

which to move. But your classifications must be refined, adopted
for remedial reasons, and not rooted in prejudice ....
...

With prestige to persuade, but not physical power to en-

force, with a will for self-preservation and the knowledge that they
are not "a bevy of Platonic Guardians," the Justices generally follow, they do not lead, changes taking place elsewhere in society.
But without taking giant strides and thereby risking a backlash too
forceful to contain, the Court, through constitutional adjudication,
can reinforce or signal a green light for social change. 219
Constitutional law scholar Robert Burt has also defended intermediate
scrutiny as a dialogue-enhancing doctrinal technique. He has argued that the
doctrine allows the Court to fulfill its institutional role as one coequal branch
of government with a coequal responsibility to interpret the Constitution:
If the Court is interested in pursuing conversation-as it should
be-rather than imposing silence on a wide range of constitutional
issues, an additional, especially useful technique appeared in the
Court's jurisprudence in the mid-1970s .... This was the invention,
in the context of gender-discrimination cases, of the so-called "middle-tier" constitutional scrutiny....
...Its great virtue, from my perspective, is its conversational
character: when the Court invalidates a statute on this basis, this
action permits and even invites a legislative response....
the Supreme Court engages in conversation with society and lower courts); BURT, supra note 46
(arguing that the Court's role in constitutional interpretation should be equal with that of the
other branches); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. Rnv. 577, 653
(1993) ("I call the process of judicial review that actually occurs in the workaday world dialogue.

The term emphasizes that judicial review is significantly more interdependent and interactive
than generally described." (footnote omitted)). But see ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTrruTIONAL
CULTURES: THE MENTALrrY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7-12 (1989) (suggesting

that less dialogue might be better).
219 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a JudicialVoice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185, 1204, 1208

(1992) (footnotes omitted).
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... [U]nlike strict scrutiny, when the Court invalidates a statute
under the middle-tier test, the successful litigant has not won a conclusive victory. Her triumph is only tentative, subject to later reversal if her adversary returns to the legislative battlefield. The Court's
action does, however, significantly alter the terms of this subsequent
combat. By overturning the original enactment, the Court shifts the
balance of advantage toward the winning litigant. Her claim has
been given heightened public visibility and moral sanction. The losing litigant knows, moreover, that he cannot muster the same majority to do nothing more than re-enact the identical measure that
the Court has overturned ....
...
[M]id-level scrutiny is admirably suited in many different
contexts as a technique-like those identified by Bickel-for pro22 0
moting interchange between court and legislature.

Legislative responses to recent cases involving intermediate scrutiny
demonstrate this interbranch dialogue. For example, after the Court decided
Adarand, which announced a formal strict scrutiny standard for affirmative
action programs but which was perceived by many as announcing a de facto
intermediate scrutiny standard because of the Court's statement that strict
scrutiny is not "fatal in fact," 22 1 the Department of Justice, relying specifically
on this language in the Adarand opinion,22 2 issued a comprehensive defense
of affirmative action programs that included an analysis of why affirmative
action serves compelling interests and how it achieves these interests.2 2 3 The
report includes an extensive appendix documenting the legislative history of
various congressional affirmative action programs22 4 and demonstrating that
minorities are consistently discriminated against when competing for contracting jobs.225 The report concludes that although society has made much
progress towards fulfilling racial equality, nevertheless "the information compiled by the Justice Department to date demonstrates that racial discrimination and its effects continue to impair the ability of minority-owned
businesses to compete in the nation's contracting markets."'22 6 This report is
the next step in an ongoing dialogue among the Court and the other branches
of government regarding how to resolve the analogical crisis posed by affirmative action programs. The Court took a big step in Adarand by nearly
resolving the crisis in favor of strict scrutiny. By leaving at least some doubt
that it would invalidate all affirmative action programs, however, the Court
invited a response by the Executive Branch, which believes that the time for
maximalism has not yet arrived. When the Court next faces this issue, it will
have to take account of this position in deciding whether it should concluBURT, supra note 46, at 362-65.
221 See supra note 147.
222 See Department of Justice, Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,042, 26,050 & n.2 (May 23, 1996).
223 See id. at 26,042-63.
224 See id. at 26,050-54.
225 See id. at 26,054-62.
226 Id. at 26,062.
220
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sively resolve the affirmative action issue or perhaps retreat a bit, allowing
further consideration and conversation before speaking definitively on one of
society's most divisive social issues.227
The Court can also use intermediate scrutiny to instigate a dialogue between itself and the public at-large. 2 As others have pointed out, the Court
stands in a unique position to spur and influence public debate. For example,
David Schultz and Stephen Gottlieb argue that, "[T]he judiciary's real power
and efficacy lies in how its decisions influence our political language and the
way we think about political and social issues. The Court's decisions have
-29 Likewise, as
tremendous sway over the way we think about politics .
shapes
the
constitutional
notes,
"The
Court
facilitates
and
Barry Friedman
debate. The Court sparks discussion as to what the text should mean by siding with one constituency's interpretation, or synthesizing several, as to what
our norms should be." 23 0 The Court can help focus, synthesize, shape, and
prod the public debate over constitutional values.231 By applying intermediate scrutiny to a particular type of legislation, the Court can signal that the
countervailing interest deserves protection. Whether the interest is the desire not to be discriminated against because of gender or mental disability or
even the desire to advertise free of governmental constraints, intermediate
scrutiny signals to the public at-large that the desire at issue is, in some important sense, a right. Calling something a "right" has a transformative effect
on how that interest is perceived and protected in the political process,23 2 and
by recognizing a right, the Court grants public legitimacy to the claim of the
rightholder.23 3 If the Court truly can influence the public agenda, shape the
political language, and serve as an educative institution, 234 then the decision
227 For another example of how intermediate scrutiny can instigate dialogue among the
branches, see infra note 286.
228 Of course, the distinction between the people "at-large" and the legislature, which theoretically at least is controlled by the people, is an artificial one. I refer to the "public at-large" in
this section to refer to public opinion in general (both about the issue and the Court) as opposed
to how the public might make its desires known through the legislative process.
229 David Schultz & Stephen E. Gottlieb, Legal Functionalismand Social Change: A Reassessment of Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, 12 J.L. &
PoL. 63, 90 (1996).
230 Friedman, supra note 218, at 654.
231 See id. at 668-71.
232 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Nonsupreme Court, 91 McHI. L. REv. 1121, 1128 (1993)
(book review); see also Michael J. Sandel, Last Rights, NEw REPUBLiC, Apr. 14, 1997, at 27, 27
("The philosophers rightly observe that existing laws against assisted suicide reflect and entrench
certain views about what gives life meaning.... [W]ere the Court to declare.., a right to
assisted suicide, [t]he new regime... would encourage the tendency to view life less as a gift and
more as a possession.").
233 See Schultz & Gottlieb, supra note 229, at 74 ("Judicial decisions can change assumptions not only by opening new options for opposition, but also through their power to grant
legitimacy to certain claims and to redefine norms of institutional action.").
234 See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?,67 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 961, 964 (1992). Eisgruber states:
I defend the claim that the Supreme Court cannot be fully understood except as an
institution with educative responsibilities, responsibilities that depend upon the excellence of its arguments. At the heart of my theory is an argument about what
kind of education the Court is able to give to the American people. That argument
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to apply intermediate scrutiny to a particular classification or regulation will
likely create at least a modest dialogue between235the Court and the public

about the nature of the analogical crisis at hand.
This dialogue among the Court, the coordinate branches, and the public
can increase the chances that over time, moral uncertainty over controversial

constitutional issues will decline, thereby tipping the balance in favor of the
Court employing maximalism, rather than minimalism, to resolve analogical
crisis. In other words, dialogue is not important only because it allows an
exchange between different institutions, but also because it improves the
chances that society can move towards consensus on controversial issues. As
takes seriously a feature of the Court's educative practice normally regarded as
merely ornamental: namely, that the Court's interpretations of American politics
are somehow "inspirational."
Id.
235 In his important book, Gerald Rosenberg argues that Court decisions generally do not
spur public debate and do not affect social change. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABoUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). As evidence of the former, Rosenberg points to, among other things, the fact that the Court's decisions on women's rights did
not attract any increase in press coverage of women's issues. See id. at 230. But Rosenberg only
analyzes press coverage for a few years following the important Court cases. Of course, the
Court's influence may take time to instigate debate or change attitudes. See Schultz & Gottlieb,
supra note 229, at 72-74. Moreover, there is evidence that recent cases on controversial constitutional issues have attracted increased press coverage. For example, a LEXIS database search
shows that the number of magazine stories mentioning the phrases "right to die" or "physician
assisted suicide" nearly doubled in 1996, when the Court agreed to hear Quill v. Vacco. During
the period of 1992-1995, between 124 and 135 magazine articles mentioned one of these phrases.
In 1996, 205 articles mentioned one of them, and from January 1, 1997, through April 7, 1997, 83
articles mentioned one of them. A search in the major paper database demonstrates this even
more forcefully. Mentions of one of the phrases rose from 755 in 1994 and 577 in 1995 to 1,663
in 1996. As of April 7, 1997, there were 688 mentions in 1997. See also Sunstein, supra note 42,
at 70 & n.315 (describing the "immediate, intense public reaction to Romer").
Although Rosenberg's broader point about the Court's ability to influence social change has
been extremely influential, it has been criticized by many scholars. One argument is that Rosenberg focuses on hard data while ignoring equally important types of influence, such as the
Court's "role in shaping the national conscience." Book Note, Grand Illusion, 105 HARv. L.
Rv. 1135, 1140 (1992); see also Stephen J. Kastenberg, Book Note, 29 HAsv. J. ON LEGIS. 589,
598 (1992) ("[H]e overvalues 'hard numbers' as compared to anecdotal, interview, or other evidence that offer glimmers of more opaque, perhaps longer-term or more diffused impacts of a
decision or series of decisions."). Others have argued that Rosenberg overstates his claims. See
Stephen L. Carter, Do Courts Matter?, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1216, 1221 (1992); Kastenberg, supra,at
596-98. Most important, however, is the argument that although Rosenberg may convincingly
argue that courts cannot affect social change by themselves, his position actually strengthens the
argument that the Court can act together with other social and political institutions to affect
social change. See Schultz & Gottlieb, supra note 229, at 67 ("We conclude that Rosenberg's
analysis actually demonstrates that the Court is, indeed, an effective institution. When we realize that the Court is but one branch of government, which, like every other branch, must work
with others to effect its goals, Rosenberg's claim that courts can effect change in combination
with others is in reality an important affirmation of judicial efficacy .. "); see also Neal Devins,
JudicialMatters, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1027, 1067 (1992) (book review) ("While Rosenberg does a
masterful job of showing that courts do not effect change alone, he goes too far in refusing to
recognize that the judiciary is actively involved in a partnership with elected government."). Of
course, this Article's thesis rests on the idea that the Court can reach consensus on certain issues
through dialogue with other institutions. Because it does not claim that the Court can effect
change alone, it is not undermined by Rosenberg's thesis.
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this Article argues, it is generally preferable for the Court to employ maximalism rather than minimalism if possible. 23 6 Moreover, one of the important advantages of minimalism is that it facilitates a shift to conditions
favoring maximalism. 23 7 By instigating dialogue through minimalism, the
Court can accelerate this shift. Of course, increasing debate will not always
lead to consensus. Some crises are probably forever insoluble without great
conflict. Abortion may be one of these crises. It is unlikely that the Court
could have resolved the issue much better than it did had it employed
minimalism rather than maximalism in Roe v. Wade.23 8 But dialogue can
help resolve analogical crisis in two ways. First, by focusing attention on the
issue and encouraging public debate, the Court can educate itself about the
extent of moral uncertainty that exists on the issue and the direction of that
uncertainty. As a result, the Court might realize that there is a broad consensus on certain values. This information can help the Court in determining the
appropriateness of a maximalist solution to the "crisis." Second, by getting
arguments out in the open, testing these arguments in public debate, and
evaluating the implications of various ideas, public dialogue can help change
social attitudes and create consensus as one set of ideas gradually gains a
majority position. The notion that public dialogue can spur consensus
through the clash of ideas is at the heart of our First Amendment jurisprudence.23 9 The Court cannot reach a social consensus by itself. When faced
with an analogical crisis about the meaning of the Constitution, the Court
must recognize that "[t]he process of reaching an interpretative consensus on
the text is dynamic," 2 and it should apply a minimalistic technique like intermediate scrutiny to prompt dialogue that will gradually lead the Court and
society together towards a fruitful, legitimate, and broadly appealing resolu241
tion of the crisis.
236 See supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 110-117 and accompanying text.
238 See Sullivan, supra note 232, at 1128 ("I strongly doubt whether politics alone would
have outperformed Roe in advancing reproductive rights.... Burt favors the optimistic view that

American social relations are 'amenable to peaceful compromise,' but our recent national experience-consider not only abortion but also the debate over gay service members in the military-furnishes plenty of justification for Hobbesian pessimism." (footnote and citation
omitted)).
239 Justice Holmes advanced this idea in his oft-quoted dissent, in which he stated:

But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideasthat the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the

competition of the market ....
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
240 Friedman, supra note 218, at 654.
241 It should be noted here that there is a distinct anti-state bias in the mechanism that this
Article suggests for resolving analogical crisis. If the Court applies intermediate scrutiny to leg-

islation that previously received rationality review or no scrutiny (because it was never considered before), it sends a message that the particular right involved should be respected. This will
have the inevitable effect of making it more likely that the crisis will be resolved through application of strict scrutiny rather than rationality review. The Court's recent proclivity to ratchet up
review rather than ratchet it down tends to support this point. See supra notes 29-42 and accom-

panying text. Nonetheless, this result is not inevitable, particularly if the Court makes its reasons
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III. Evaluating Recent Decisions
A.

The Need for Explicitness

In recent years, in diverse areas of constitutional law such as affirmative
action, commercial speech, and gender discrimination, the Court, in varying
degrees, has heightened its standard of scrutiny from an intermediate level
towards a strict one. 242 Although it is certainly tempting to conclude from
this trend that the Court does consciously use intermediate scrutiny as a transitional tool to resolve analogical crisis in just the way that this Article suggests it should, this is an overambitious and unprovable inference. Not only
is it difficult, if not impossible, to document how the Justices' thinking has
-evolved-for example, were they influenced by lower-court decisions, did
they suddenly have an epiphany regarding the propriety of some type of regulation, did they sense that moral viewpoints were shifting in society atlarge-but it is also surely true that some of the Court's shifts are attributable
either directly or indirectly to changes in the Court's personnel. 243 Instead,
this Article opts for a weak descriptive claim. It is clear that intermediate
scrutiny is highly unstable and often evolves into a stricter form of scrutiny.
Moreover, there are a number of coherent explanations for why and how
intermediate scrutiny might facilitate such an evolution. One can plausibly
conclude that at least in some situations, to some degree, the Court has used
techniques such as those described in the last section to hone its thinking,
support its conclusions, and help it move closer to resolving the various analogical crises it has faced in recent years.
for applying intermediate scrutiny explicit. One could imagine that the other branches and the
public at-large might stand firm in supporting the state's right to pass certain types of legislation
and reject the Court's message about the importance of a particular "right." The Court might
then decide to resolve the crisis by limiting review to a rationality standard. One might conceive
of the Court's experiments with heightened scrutiny for wealth classifications in this way. The
Court initially suggested that the state could not discriminate on the basis of wealth. See, e.g.,
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) ("Lines drawn on the basis of
wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored." (citation omitted)); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (plurality opinion) ("In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color."). Later, it retreated
from this position and has "shown increasing reluctance to strictly scrutinize state practices withholding benefits because of inability to pay for them." GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONS rrUTIONAL LAW 755 (3d ed. 1996). One explanation for the Court's retreat might be that it realized
the state must have latitude to discriminate on the basis of ability-to-pay, and it might have
realized this because state and federal law-making bodies stood firm against the Court's pronouncements in cases like Griffin and Harper and continued to pass such laws.
242 See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
243 This is certainly true with respect to the shift from Metro Broadcastingto Adarand. The
four dissenters in Metro Broadcasting (Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, and Chief Justice Relnquist) were joined by Justice Thomas to make up the 5-4 majority in Adarand. The
analysis is not so clear in other contexts. For example, in the shift from Posadas to 44 Liquormart, two Justices who voted to uphold the law in Posadas (Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor) voted to strike the law in 44 Liquormart, although not for the maximalist reasons
posited in Justice Stevens's or Justice Thomas's opinions. Moreover, the other member of the
Court who heard both cases, Justice Stevens, took a much harder line on commercial speech
regulations in 44 Liquormart than he did in Posadas. Compare 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1504-13 (1996) (Stevens, J., writing for the plurality), with Posadas de
Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 359-63 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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More important, this Article posits two basic normative arguments. The
first of these arguments, discussed already, is that the Court should use intermediate scrutiny to help it resolve analogical crises.244 The second argument
is that the Court should be as explicit as possible in its opinions about how
and why it has chosen to employ intermediate scrutiny to help it resolve an
analogical crisis. By being explicit about its purposes, the Court can go a
long way towards answering those critics who have charged that intermediate
scrutiny fosters indeterminacy, encourages judicial activism, and undermines
principles of stare decisis. The remainder of this section explores this second
normative claim and analyzes some of the Court's recent decisions in light of
it.
If intermediate scrutiny is understood primarily as a transitional device
rather than as a final solution to constitutional problems, its defects suddenly
appear much less disturbing. For example, one of intermediate scrutiny's
main drawbacks is that it does not provide lower courts with much guidance
about how to decide particular cases. If intermediate scrutiny is viewed as a
permanent solution to issues of constitutional law, this lack of guidance is
highly problematic. The Court, from this perspective, has deliberately chosen a path that will guarantee widespread confusion indefinitely. But the
Court would be on much better footing if it explicitly explained that although
its use of intermediate scrutiny will certainly cause some temporary confusion, it is using the technique to develop maximalist solutions over time and
to bring long-term benefits to both lower courts and practitioners. Though it
may seem strange for the Court to include such an admission in an opinion, it
is worth remembering three salient points: (1) As Justice Breyer's opinion in
Denver Area suggests, the Court has already begun taking strides towards
admitting when it does not know how to conclusively decide controversial
issues;245 (2) In certain situations, announcing a maximalist rule to govern
situations involving moral flux poses a dangerous threat to the Court's legitimacy;2 46 and (3) Because the Court is apparently already using intermediate
scrutiny as a transitional tool,24 7 an explicit statement to this effect will not
change the Court's substantive resolution of the pertinent problems, but will
simply express courageous honesty about how the judicial process really
works.
Treating intermediate scrutiny as a transitional technique also alleviates
the other problems inherent in a minimalistic balancing test like the midlevel
tier of review. Although intermediate scrutiny in any capacity is open to the
charge that it invites judges to reach any decision they want in any particular
case, this problem becomes less important if one stops viewing intermediate
scrutiny in static terms-as a one-time solution to a single problem-and
more in dynamic terms-as a method of solving a problem over time. Judges
may reach decisions under intermediate scrutiny that are not entirely princi244 See supra notes 176-201 and accompanying text.

See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 184-196 and accompanying text.
This is true even if, as the above discussion of the Article's weak descriptive claim
posits, the Court is not doing so consciously, purposefully, or for the reasons that this Article
suggests.
245
246
247
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pled, but they do so in service of a larger goal, and this makes the problem
much less daunting. Likewise, viewing intermediate scrutiny dynamically
reduces the concern that it threatens stare decisis values. If the Court explicitly reserves the right to change its thinking over time, then it will not
threaten stare decisis values, such as reliance or predictability, when it later
changes its mind because the Court will already have served notice to society
of the future change. One could argue that the Court should not use a doctrine subject to change in the first place, but it is critical to remember here
that the Court is already doing this, and, moreover, as the above discussion
suggests, it benefits society for the Court to do so.
B.

The Cases

Because the Court has decided several cases in recent Terms that move
towards resolving analogical crises, it is important in evaluating these cases to
consider what the ideal opinion in this context might look like. The ideal
opinion would contain several important elements. First, it would explicitly
explain the existence of the analogical crisis-what the crisis is and how it has
developed. Second, it would discuss the Court's (as well as lower courts' and
commentators') efforts to deal with the crisis and would note any progress or
change in thinking that has already occurred. Finally, it would make very
clear the Court's current thinking on the nature of the analogical crisis. If the
Court has decided to resolve the crisis conclusively one way or the other, it
should spend considerable time addressing the analogical questions in the
case and explaining the resolution. If it decides not to issue a conclusive
resolution, it should state clearly that certain issues remain too difficult to
decide conclusively and reassert its right to reconsider the question in the
future. Of course, given the current conception of intermediate scrutiny as a
static doctrine, the decisions that the Court has rendered in the context of
analogical crisis in recent Terms are not explicit about using intermediate
scrutiny as a transitional tool and therefore do not exactly meet this ideal.
This lack of explicitness has posed difficulties when the Court has tried to
explain its decision as stemming naturally from precedent. Apart from this
admittedly important problem, however, the three cases discussed hereAdarand, Virginia, and 44 Liquormart-allimpressively addressed the nature
of the relevant analogical crisis and provided compelling reasoning in support
of the particular resolution (or near-resolution) that the Court chose.
Adarand,at least as a formal matter,2 4 dealt quite well with the analogical questions presented by affirmative action programs. Affirmative action
raises a wide range of analogical questions, ranging from the question of
whether it is permissible to discriminate against whites because they lack a
history of being discriminated against 249 and possess adequate power in the
248 In other words, although I find Justice Stevens's reasoning in dissent far more substantively persuasive than the majority's reasoning, see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 242-64 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting), the majority opinion does meet the formal criteria of
a near-ideal opinion attempting to resolve an analogical crisis.
249 See, e.g., Richard Lempert, The Force of Irony: On the Morality of Affirmative Action
and United Steelworkers v. Weber, 95 E-mcs 86, 89 (1984) (discussing the irony of a white
plaintiff's claim of race discrimination).
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political process25 0 to the problem of whether benign discrimination harms
minorities through social stigmatization. 251 No case should be expected to
deal explicitly with all the theoretical issues raised by a complex analogical
crisis such as affirmative action, but Adarand adequately addressed many of
them. The Court described the analogical crisis well by briefly reciting the
precedent dealing with racial discrimination by the federal government and
noting that most of the time, though not always, the Court has treated them
m 252 The Court also
the same as cases involving discrimination by the states
presented a good account of past progress in addressing the analogical crisis
by explaining its analysis in previous cases of affirmative action, discussing its
decisions in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,253 Fullilove v.
Klutznick,25 4 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,255 United States v. Paradise,256 Croson, and Metro Broadcasting.257 Interestingly, Justice O'Connor's
opinion also rioted academic commentary critical of the Court's Metro
Broadcastingdecision and stated: "Metro Broadcasting'sapplication of different standards of review to federal and state racial classifications has been
consistently criticized by commentators." 258 This statement lends further
support to the idea that the Court can use intermediate scrutiny to invite
commentary that it can then draw upon to help it resolve analogical crises.
Most important, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court provides a
coherent explanation of why the Court should treat benign discrimination as
it does traditional discrimination. The opinion points to three general propositions established by previous cases (skepticism, consistency, and congruence) and concludes with the broad, maximalist principle that "any person, of
whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject
to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to
250 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 216, at 735 ("When the group that controls the decision making
process classifies so as to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself, the reasons for being
unusually suspicious, and, consequently, employing a stringent brand of review, are lacking.");
see also Sandalow, supra note 216, at 694-95 (pointing out that affirmative action programs affect
sub-groups within the white population differently).
251 See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage:Race, the Supreme Cour4 and the Constitution, 46 U. Ci. L. Rv. 775, 809 (1979) ("[O]ne gets beyond racism by getting beyond it
now: by a complete, resolute, and credible commitment never to tolerate in one's own life-or in
the life or practices of one's government-the differential treatment of other human beings by
race."). For other commentary on the question of affirmative action, see T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness,91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060 (1991), Christopher L. Eisgruber, PoliticalUnity and the Powers of Government, 41 UCLA L. Rnv. 1297 (1994), Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAR. L. REv. 1 (1991), Greenawalt,
supra note 216, Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REv.955 (1974), Richard A. Posner, The Defunis Case and the Constitutionality
of PreferentialTreatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. Rnv. 1, David A. Strauss, The Myth
of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 99, and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination:
Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARv.L. Rnv. 78 (1986).
252 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213-18.
253 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
254 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
255 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
256 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
257 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 218-27.
258 See id. at 232 (plurality opinion) (citing four law review articles).
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unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny." 259 Moreover, Justice

O'Connor defended this principle and argued strongly in favor of analogizing
benign discrimination to traditional discrimination when she responded directly to Justice Stevens's dissent.260 One may not agree with her conclusions
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects persons rather than groups, that
strict scrutiny is necessary in the benign discrimination context in order to
differentiate between permissible and nonpermissible governmental use of
race, and that consistency is critical to a principled understanding of the
Equal Protection Clause,261 but no resolution to an analogical crisis will satisfy everyone. At the low threshold of whether the opinion presents a wellreasoned, justifiable, and legitimate resolution to an analogical crisis, the
opinion certainly succeeds. Finally, the Court wisely recognized that it
should not conclusively resolve the divisive question of affirmative action; by
emphasizing that strict scrutiny is not fatal in fact, the Court has, as Justice
Ginsburg notes in dissent, allowed its affirmative action doctrine'262"to evolve,
still to be informed by and responsive to changing conditions.
The Adarand opinion is less successful in addressing Metro Broadcasting.
Because Adarand applied strict scrutiny to federal benign discrimination programs, the Court had to explain over Justice Stevens's strident dissent 263 how
it could violate principles of stare decisis and overrule Metro Broadcasting,
which only five years earlier had applied intermediate scrutiny to such
laws.264 In order to do this, Justice O'Connor argued that Metro Broadcasting "undermined important principles of this Court's equal protection jurisprudence ' 265 and that overruling Metro Broadcasting would therefore be a
restoration rather than a departure from precedent. 266 To support its position, the Court distinguished its decision in Adarand from its articulation of
stare decisis principles in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey267 on the ground that
Metro Broadcastingitself was a departure from precedent and was decided a
short time before Adarand.268 The Court therefore admitted that it had decided a previous case incorrectly and implied that it can violate principles of
stare decisis whenever it decides that a previous case was incorrect. Moreover, by using a circular argument to distinguish Adarand from Casey, the
Court essentially said that it will not overrule a prior case simply because it
thinks the case was decided wrongly unless it thinks it was really decided
wrongly (i.e., it departed from previous law); this is certainly not the best
position for the Court to put itself. In Metro Broadcasting,the Court instead
should have realized that intermediate scrutiny is an inherently unstable
259
260
261
262
263
264

Id. at 224.
See id. at 227-31.
See id. at 226-31.
Id. at 276 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 242-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 600 (1990), overruled by Adarand,515 U.S.

200.
265
266

Adarand, 515 U.S. at 231 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 233-34 (plurality opinion) ("By refusing to follow Metro Broadcasting, then,

we do not depart from the fabric of the law; we restore it.").
267 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
268 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 233-34.
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creature that often merely represents a transitional, tentative solution to a
problem that the Court will later resolve differently. If the Court had recognized this in Metro Broadcasting,it simply could have said in Adarand:
In Metro Broadcasting,we announced that we were applying intermediate scrutiny to federally supported benign discrimination programs because we were at that time unsure about whether we
should treat these programs as we treat state-supported affirmative
action programs. At that time, we noted that if after further reflection on the issue, we decided that we should treat these two types of
laws similarly, we reserved the right to announce a heightened standard of review. Today, for the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that we should treat benign discrimination. programs
implemented by the federal government as we do those programs
implemented by states and localities. Therefore, as of today, federal
benign discrimination programs will be subject to strict scrutiny.
Courts should no longer apply Metro Broadcasting'sintermediate
scrutiny standard.
Such a solution would have been much better than the Court's actual
treatment of Metro Broadcastingin Adarand,which is both inherently unsatisfactory and precedentially dangerous.
The Court's decision in Virginia also may have moved towards resolving
an analogical crisis. In doing so, the case strongly analyzed the underlying
issues, providing an excellent summary of previous cases and compelling reasons in favor of applying a high level of scrutiny to laws discriminating on the
basis of gender. 269 But critics have attacked the opinion for substituting the
stricter "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard in place of the intermediate scrutiny standard the Court traditionally had applied to genderbased laws. 270 Of course, the Court had articulated the "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard several times before Virginia,271 but as one commentator has noted, in Virginia, the Court "moved the phrase to a pivotal
primary position." 272 Two Justices in separate opinions attacked this alleged
shift, noting that it "introduces an element of uncertainty" 273 and "drastically

revises our established standards." 274 Although this criticism is unwarranted-for all the reasons given in this Article-it perhaps can be explained
by the Court's conception of intermediate scrutiny as a static doctrine. If, for
example, the Court had originally conceived of intermediate scrutiny as a
dynamic, transitional doctrine, it could have noted in earlier cases that its
intermediate level of review was subject to change over time. Then, in Virginia, the Court-if it indeed wanted to raise the level of review-simply
could have announced that the time for change had arrived. It is quite likely
269 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274-76 (1996).
270 See supra notes 42-43.

271 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136, 141 n.12 (1994); Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
272 Udell, supra note 28, at 553.

273 Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment).
274 Id. at 2291 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that
the majority had adopted strict scrutiny without acknowledging it).
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that such an explicit move would have helped silence those critics who believe that the majority exercised a sleight of hand by substituting a higher
level of review for gender-based laws.
Finally, in 44 Liquormart,at least four members of the Court voted to
apply a stricter than intermediate level of review to regulations of truthful
speech. 275 Justice Thomas argued that the Central Hudson test should not

apply at all to regulations of truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech,
which he believes are per se invalid. 276 Justice Stevens's plurality opinion
argued that total bans of truthful and nonmisleading advertising for purposes
unrelated to consumer protection must be reviewed with "special care"

under Central Hudson.277 Sunstein criticizes both the plurality opinion and
Justice Thomas's concurrence for prematurely and unnecessarily reaching
maximalist conclusions. 278 Although Sunstein is surely right that the question
of whether commercial speech deserves protection commensurate with the
protection afforded core political speech is a hotly contested one,2 79 Justices
275 Four Justices (Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg) joined Parts III and V
of the plurality opinion, which held that prohibitions of truthful and nonmisleading speech about
a lawful product for reasons unrelated to consumer protection, must be reviewed with "special
care" under CentralHudson. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1506-07,
1508 (1996). Only three Justices (Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg) joined Part IV of
the opinion, holding that where a state entirely prohibits "the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment
generally demands." Id. at 1507. Justice Souter's refusal to join this part of the opinion, while
joining other parts of the opinion which call for a higher standard of review, makes it somewhat
unclear where the law in this area currently stands. For an analysis of the various positions on
how to review commercial speech regulations articulated in 44 Liquormart, see Sullivan, supra
note 138, at 138-45.
276 See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1517-19 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
277 See id. at 1506-07 (plurality opinion).
278 See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 83-86.
279 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, CommercialSpeech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom,62
IOWA L. REv. 1, 3 (1976) ("[C]ommercial speech is not a manifestation of individual freedom or
choice."); Vincent Blasi, The PathologicalPerspective and the FirstAmendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 449, 486 (1985) ("Commercial advertising was never a concern in any of the historic political struggles over freedom of expression."); Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1317 (1988) (defending the Court's protection of
commercial speech); R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (1977)
("It seems to me that the arguments ... use[d] to support freedom in the market for ideas are
equally applicable in the market for goods."); Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 216, at 17-18 (arguing that protection of commercial speech is a resurrection of Lochnerism); Richard A. Posner,
Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 39 (1986) ("Also sensible
from an economic standpoint is the lesser protection given to speech or writing that is intended
as commercial advertising ....
); Martin H. Redish, The FirstAmendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429, 443-44
(1971) ("When the individual is presented with rational grounds for preferring one product or
brand over another, he is encouraged to consider the competing information... [and to] exercise his abilities to reason and think; this aids him towards the intangible goal of rational selffulfillment."); T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 519, 541 (1979) (arguing that commercial speech deserves less than full protection); Steven Shiffrin, The FirstAmendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212, 1225-39 (1983) (critiquing Jackson's
and Jeffries's thesis).
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Stevens and Thomas did offer well-reasoned defenses for their conclusions.
Justice Stevens, for example, directly addressed the analogical crisis when he
defended his decision to apply higher scrutiny to total bans of truthful and
nonmisleading speech. In support of his position that the Court should treat
these bans with "the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally
demands," 28 0 he argued that total bans "all but foreclose alternative means of
disseminating certain information," 28 1 that truth-suppressing regulations are
not rendered less suspect by virtue of the fact that they aim at objectively
verifiable or durable speech, 2 and that such bans "impede debate over central issues of public policy. '28 3 Such bans often obscure a true, underlying
governmental policy, 284 and rest solely on the "offensive assumption that the
public will respond 'irrationally' to the truth." 28 Although one may legitimately dispute these conclusions, they surely represent adequate justifications for resolving the analogical crisis in favor of stricter review, and the
critics' silence regarding the decision certainly supports Justice Stevens's position that the time has arrived for the Court to apply a maximalist approach
2 86
to at least some regulations of commercial speech.
But, the Court was less than persuasive in its use of precedent to support
its decision. Justice Stevens cited footnote nine of the Central Hudson opinion2 7 four times in support of his position that the Court should use "special
280 44 Liquormart,116 S. Ct. at 1507 (plurality opinion).
281 Id.
282 See iL at 1507-08.
283 Id. at 1508.

284 See id.
285

Id.

Of course, because it is not clear how many Justices support this view, see supra note
275, the crisis has not yet been resolved. Moreover, it is also unclear how the Court will treat
regulations of commercial speech that are not total bans or that do aim at misleading or untruthful speech. Importantly, these questions bear heavily on perhaps the most important commercial
speech question still open at this time-whether the federal government can regulate cigarette
advertising to protect children. For perspectives on 44 Liquormart'simpact on this question, see
Edward 0. Correia, State and Local Regulation of CigaretteAdvertising, 23 J.LEGIs. 1 (1997),
Liza Goitein et al., Developments in Policy: The FDA's Tobacco Regulations, 15 YALE L. &
Por'Y REv. 399 (1996), Barbara Dority, The Rights of Joe Camel and the Marlboro Man, HuMAms, Jan/Feb. 1997, at 34 (arguing that the cigarette regulations are ill-advised and unconstitutional), and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Muzzle Joe Camel? It May Be Illegal, NEWSDAY, May 30,
1996, at A51 (arguing that the tobacco regulations ignore three basic free speech principles,
which were reaffirmed in 44 Liquormart).See also Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and
the FirstAmendment, 81 IowA L. REv. 589 (1996) (arguing that a total ban on tobacco advertising would violate CentralHudson test). The Clinton administration has argued at length that the
new regulations do not violate 44 Liquormart. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg.
44,396 (1996). This can be seen as the next chapter in thedialogue over the commercial speech
analogical crisis. Although some have argued that the cigarette regulations are unconstitutional,
see Sullivan, supra, the fact that Americans overwhelmingly support the regulations might argue
in favor of the Court taking a minimalistic approach when it eventually addresses this issue. See
CBS News Poll, 8/26/96, available in Westlaw, POLL Database (finding that 67% of those polled
approve of the recent regulations).
287 Footnote nine states:
We review with special care regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in
order to pursue a nonspeech-related policy. In those circumstances, a ban on
286
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care" when reviewing total bans of commercial speech that were enacted for
purposes unrelated to consumer protection. 288 Justice Stevens did accurately
recite footnote nine, but importantly, the Court has not cited the footnote a

single time between its decision in Central Hudson and its decision in 44 Liquormart twenty-six years later. As such, it is questionable authority for the
Court to rest an entire decision upon, particularly because in post-Central
Hudson cases the Court repeatedly ignored footnote nine's warning.2 89 Once

again, the plurality faced the problem of having to appear as though it was
grounding its decision in well-established precedent when it was in fact
changing the law. Of course, courts do this all the time, but here the attempt
was remarkably unpersuasive. The Court would have been in a much better

position had it previously stated that it reserved the right to heighten the
scrutiny applied to regulations of commercial speech. If it had explicitly recognized the transitional nature of intermediate scrutiny, then Justice Stevens
could have avoided his questionable footnote-citing and simply announced
that the time for maximalism had arrived.
Conclusion: Looking Towards the Future
So, where should the Court go from here? Under what circumstances
should it apply intermediate scrutiny in the future? Commentators have
called for the Court to apply it in a wide range of contexts, 290 but given the
costs of minimalism, the Court should reserve it for the most deserving situa-

tions. Determining what these situations are is an exceedingly difficult question. It is an exercise that calls out for a precise definition of analogical crisis,
but such a definition is probably unobtainable. Ultimately, the Court must
consider a number of factors to decide if intermediate scrutiny is appropriate.
These factors include the degree of moral uncertainty surrounding the issue,
whether the Court would benefit from more time to consider the issues,
speech could screen from public view the underlying governmental policy. Indeed,
in recent years this Court has not approved a blanket ban on commercial speech
unless the expression itself was flawed in some way, either because it was deceptive
or related to unlawful activity.
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980) (citation omitted).
288 See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1506, 1508, 1510 (plurality opinion). The brief for the
petitioners relied on the footnote as well. See Brief for Petitioners at 20,44 Liquormart(No. 941140).
289 Specifically, the Court ignored the message of footnote nine in Posadas,which upheld a
Puerto Rico ban on casino advertising to Puerto Rican residents. See Posadas de Puerto Rico
Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 348 (1986). The plurality in 44 Liquormartrejected the
Posadas decision, finding that it "clearly erred" and "marked ...a sharp break from our prior
precedent." 44 Liquormart,116 S.Ct. at 1511.
290 See, e.g., Hartwin Bungert, Equal Protection for Foreign and Alien Corporations: Towards IntermediateScrutiny for a Quasi-SuspectClassification,59 Mo. L. REv. 569 (1994); Marie
Appleby, Note, The Mentally Retarded: The Need for Intermediate Scrutiny, 7 B.C. TmRD
WORLD L.J. 109 (1987); David S. Dooley, Comment, Immoral Because They're Bad, Bad Because They're Wrong: Sexual Orientation and Presumptions of Parental Unfitness in Custody

Disputes, 26

CAL.

W. L. REv. 395, 397-413 (1990) (arguing that the Court should treat gays as a

quasi-suspect class); Marc Stuart Gerber, Note, Equal Protection, Public Choice Theory, and
Learnfare: Wealth ClassificationsRevisited, 81 GEO. LJ.2141 (1993) (arguing that wealth classi-

fications should be reviewed with intermediate scrutiny).
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whether the Court would benefit from further percolation and academic
commentary, whether a maximalist rule would likely spur social backlash and
forestall rational democratic deliberation, and the probability that the Court
could instigate social dialogue leading towards moral consensus. Moreover,
the Court must analyze these factors while keeping the arguments in favor of
maximalism in the background. The balance must weigh heavily in favor of
minimalism before the Court applies intermediate scrutiny. 291
With respect to the types of laws that the Court currently reviews with
intermediate scrutiny, the pertinent question is whether the time for maximalism has arrived. With commercial speech and gender discrimination, the
answer is increasingly becoming yes, at least for most types of laws.292 A
maximalist decision in either of these areas will most likely neither cause
social backlash nor come back to haunt the Court anytime soon. Moreover,
the Court has considered these issues for over twenty years and seems more
confident about how to treat them. On the other hand, affirmative action
laws remain highly divisive, and the Court should continue to apply a minifhalist treatment. The Court can achieve this approach by at least leaving
some flexibility in the strict scrutiny test and maintaining a de facto regime of
intermediate scrutiny for affirmative action laws. Even better, the Court
could expressly limit Adarand to the contracting context and continue to review affirmative action programs in other areas, such as the public school and
employment contexts, with an intermediate level of review. The Court also
should continue its current intermediate scrutiny treatment for content-neutral speech laws as it does not appear that there is any other way to resolve
this analogical crisis, if indeed one exists in this area. Finally, if it has occasion to consider such laws again in the future, it probably should maintain
intermediate scrutiny for alienage classifications, while abandoning it for
nonmarital child classifications, as the former continue to stir passions in the
society at-large while the latter no longer do.
In the future, the Court should consider employing intermediate scrutiny
in the assisted-suicide context. The Court has recently held that there is no
general right to physician-assisted suicide,293 but as several Justices have indicated, the Court may have the chance to revisit aspects of this question in the
future. 294 For example, a case in which the patient claims that a law prohibits
291 It is also worth noting how this framework differs from the Court's current method of

deciding whether to apply intermediate scrutiny to a classification in the Equal Protection context. Instead of asking whether a particular group possesses certain characteristics and is there-

fore a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the Court need only ask whether it is possible that the
group possesses characteristics that would make it analogous to groups that are suspect and
whether it would help the Court to have additional time to fully consider the case.

292 There may still be relevant distinctions between different types of regulations in these
areas. For example, there may be reasons to review regulations of false commercial speech differently than regulations of true commercial speech. See Sullivan, supra note 138, at 152 (noting
that Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Kennedy, who would apply strict scrutiny to regulations of

nonmisleading speech, would nevertheless "give some discount from strict review" to regulations
of false or misleading commercial speech).

293 See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
2258, 2261 (1997).
294 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2304-05 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); id. at 2311-12 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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him from receiving pain-relief at the end of his life would present questions
different from the ones decided in Vacco v. Quill and Washington v. Glucksberg.295 Additionally, certain applications of laws such as those challenged
in these cases might also demand a different mode of analysis. 296 Intermediate scrutiny might work for these issues because they are surrounded by great
moral uncertainty and social divisiveness and involve serious analogical questions-with supporters of a right to assisted suicide arguing that the right is
highly analogous to other rights recognized by the Court,297 and opponents
contending that the laws are analogous to the innumerable other laws that
state legislatures pass to prohibit nondesirable behavior.2 98 Moreover, as Justice Stevens persuasively demonstrated in his concurring opinions in these
cases, the state's interests in preventing assisted-suicide become less compelling in certain situations.2 99 For example, the state's interest in "preserving
the traditional integrity of the medical profession" by prohibiting the doctor
from assisting the patient with his suicide is less compelling in a case where a
doctor treats the same suffering patient whom he has treated for a lifetime.3°
But rationality review cannot identify such cases. Only intermediate scrutiny, with its attention to the specific facts of cases and its detailed exploration of the relationship between the state's interests and those facts, can
distinguish between those individual cases where physician-assisted suicide
bans are justified and those where they are not. By using intermediate scrutiny to identify these cases, the Court could educate itself about the varying
circumstances surrounding individual applications of assisted-suicide statutes
and could accompany the nation as it engages "in an earnest and profound
debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted
30
suicide." 1
A similar analogical dispute exists with laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. 302 For example, the Court soon may have the opportunity to address the question of whether a state can prohibit same-sex
295 See id. at 2312 (Breyer, J.,concurring).
296 See id. at 2310 (Stevens, J., concurring).
297 See, e.g., Kathryn L. Tucker & David J. Burman, Physician Aid in Dying: A Humane
Option, a ConstitutionallyProtected Choice, 18 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 495, 508 (1995) ("The Fourteenth Amendment protects the liberty to choose between a tortured, hideous death and a less
painful, more dignified one .... ); Joan W. Dalbey Donahue, Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide:
A "Right" Reserved for Only the Competent?, 19 VT. L. REv. 795, 813 (1995) ("IM]oral justifications for physician-assisted suicide.., are deeply rooted in our nation's traditions of liberty, selfdetermination, and the constitutional right to privacy ....
");David L. Sloss, Note, The Right to
Choose How To Die: A ConstitutionalAnalysis of State Laws ProhibitingPhysician-Assisted
Suicide, 48 STAN. L. REV.937 (1996) (arguing that all competent, terminally ill patients have a
fundamental right to die with dignity); Note, Physician-AssistedSuicide and the Right to Die with
Assistance, 105 HARv. L. REv. 2021, 2025 (1992) ("The current right to die is grounded in constitutional and common law sources that protect individuals' rights to self-determination.").
298 See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?,HASTiNoS
CENTER REP., May-June 1993, at 32; Thomas J. Marzen, "Out, Out Brief Candle": Constitutionally Prescribed Suicide for the Terminally 11, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 799 (1994).
299 See Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. at 2307 (Stevens, J., concurring).
300 See id. at 2308-09 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
301 Id. at 2275.
302 Compare Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The LiteraryArgument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. Rav. 1753 (1996) (arguing for heightened scrutiny for gays), with
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marriages. The Court could take one of a number of approaches to this issue.
It could deny certiorari and refuse to speak on the question. But an exercise
of the passive virtues here would be problematic for the reasons discussed
above.3 0 3 Alternatively, the Court could risk a severe divisive reaction by
either striking down all such laws under a strict scrutiny standard or by upholding them using rationality review.30 4 Or, as Sunstein argues, the Court
could take a minimalist approach.3 05 Assuming that minimalism is a wise
choice, the question then becomes what kind of minimalism to apply. Intermediate scrutiny could work quite well here because it would allow the Court
to test carefully the various interests asserted by the state and to ensure that
they are directly and substantially related to the laws in question. It would
allow the Court to act incrementally, to learn about the issue, and to instigate
a fruitful dialogue with the nation as a whole, something the Court has yet to
do on the issue of gay rights.
Of course, the existence of a serious analogical question does not necessarily mean that the Court must apply intermediate scrutiny. More minimalist forms of minimalism, such as adopting a Calabresian anti-desuetude
stance 30 6 or writing very narrow opinions like Romer, might suffice for such
divisive issues as physician-assisted suicide and gay rights. Understandably,
the Court has been reluctant to apply a heightened standard of review to laws
involving either of these issues. In part, this reluctance may stem from the
Court's conception of intermediate scrutiny as a permanent solution to constitutional issues-as a way of saying, once and for all, that a particular type
of law is inherently suspect. Sending such a message may ironically seem to
the Court as a step too maximalist to take. But in fact and in theory, intermediate scrutiny is not a static doctrine but a dynamic one. It provides not
conclusive answers but flexibility, time, and assistance to a Court that needs
all three to help it resolve the most divisive constitutional issues of the day.
The Court should recognize these attributes and should not hesitate to employ intermediate scrutiny when it perceives a situation, such as an analogical
crisis, that calls for a relatively aggressive minimalist approach.
In his insightful concurring opinion in Denver Area, Justice Souter supported Justice Breyer's cautious plurality opinion by emphasizing the dynamic and transitional nature of the Court's constitutional decisions. He
noted:
Justice Breyer wisely reasons by direct analogy rather than by rule,
concluding that the speech and the restriction at issue in this case
may usefully be measured against the ones at issue in Pacifica. If
that means it will take some time before reaching a final method of
Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1 (1994) (addressing constitu-

tional arguments in support of gay rights).
303 See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
304 See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 97-98.
305 See id.

306 See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 742 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (arguing
that the legislature should reconsider its reasons for keeping the state's anti-physician-assisted
suicide laws and make these reasons explicit), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); see also Sunstein,
supra note 42, at 94-96 (praising Judge Calabresi's "innovative solution").
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review for cases like this one, there may be consolation in recalling
that 16 years passed, from Roth v. United States to Miller v. California, before the modem obscenity rule jelled; that it took over 40
years, from Hague v. CIO to Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., for the public forum category to settle out; and that a
round half-century passed before the clear and present danger of
Schenck v. United States evolved into the modem incitement rule of
Brandenburgv. Ohio.
I cannot guess how much time will go by until the technologies of
communication before us today have matured and their relationships become known. But until a category of indecency can be defined both with reference to the new technology and with a prospect
of durability, the job of the courts will be just what Justice Breyer
does today: recognizing established First Amendment interests
through a close analysis that constrains the Congress, without
wholly incapacitating it in all matters of the significance apparent
here, maintaining the high value of open communication, measuring
the costs of regulation by exact attention to fact, and compiling a
pedigree of experience with the changing subject. These are familiar judicial responsibilities in times when we know too little to risk
the finality of precision, and attention to them will probably take us
30 7
through the communications revolution.
Denver Area might not have been the best case for judicial minimalism,
but Justice Souter's points are nonetheless still broadly important and worth
remembering. His emphasis on the importance of constraining legislatures
while maintaining open dialogue, of paying close attention to the particular
facts of cases that come before the Court, and of developing an understanding of the subject matter in question resonates with what has been discussed
here. Most important, Justice Souter reminds us that it can take time for the
Court to settle upon a satisfactory resolution to difficult constitutional questions. The dynamic nature of constitutional law is too often either scoffed at
or ignored. The Justices are fallible, and the issues they are called upon to
solve are frequently daunting and enormously complex. Neither the Court
nor its watchers should expect that these issues can always be solved on the
first try. Instead, the Court and those who would criticize it should remember that each case is part of a larger process of solving difficult issues over
time. Hopefully, Denver Area will mark the beginning of a trend where the
Court and its watchers alike will together recognize that constitutional decisionmaking is often incremental, proceeding a step at a time towards solutions everyone can embrace.

307 Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2402-03
(1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (footnote and citations omitted).

